再探股東提案權制度及其救濟途徑——以我國公開發行公司為中心

Abstract

基於我國股東向公司行使提案權之案例於近期屢見不鮮，然學說上對於股東提案權制度仍有眾多疑義未有定見，本文遂以我國股東提案權制度為研究主題，試圖對其進行全面釐清與改善。 本文首先觀察我國近幾年公開發行公司之股東提案行使情形，主要發現為我國現行法之股東提案門檻過高，且部分提案內容並無實益而有叨擾股東會之嫌；至於現行提案範圍之界定方式則大致能為董事會所遵守，惟仍有非股東會所得決議之事項被列入，抑或屬股東會得決議之應列入事項卻未遭列入之狀況發生，此時董事會應如何處理或股東應如何尋求救濟，即有檢討之必要。 於梳理我國股東提案行使情形後，本文續而以美國法制作為比較法之參酌對象，分別從實體上之規範制度與程序上之救濟途徑兩大方面對我國法制加以檢討。就規範制度部分，本文基於股東提案權得以增進股東與公司間之溝通、並在一定程度上促進股東民主，故主張對股東提案門檻應適度放寬、對提案範圍亦應採較寬容之解釋；相權衡之下，對於提案之形式限制、其資訊揭露方式及提案股東之出席義務則可較嚴格要求之；此外，本文亦主張可依據我國實情，增訂公司得排除之其他事由。 而在救濟途徑部分，本文統整我國現行法下之行政機關介入權限與司法實務審理情形，並指出現有救濟方式不盡理想之處，尤其，於董事會違法不列入股東提案時，我國現行法除欠缺有效之事前救濟管道外，司法實務就定暫時狀態假處分之審理亦有疑義。而參酌美國法上之事前救濟手段後，本文進而主張，應責成金管會以行政指導方式行使事前之提案審查權，作為第一層次之救濟；本文亦認為，法院於審理與股東提案權有關之定暫時狀態假處分時，應以本案勝訴可能性為審查重點，以增進審理效率。

In light of the fact that more and more shareholders are submitting proposals to their companies while controversies concerning the shareholder proposal right still exist among academics, this Thesis seeks to contribute to a comprehensive improvement on the shareholder proposal right in Taiwan. First, this Thesis takes a look at the status quo of the shareholder proposals for public companies in Taiwan during recent years. It finds out that the eligibility standards are too high, some proposals are interfering with the usual shareholder meetings, and that the scope of proposals in Taiwanese current rules can generally guide the board. However, some proposals that are out of shareholder’s power are being included whilst others within shareholder’s power are wrongfully excluded; this Thesis therefore examines how the board should address the issue or how shareholders could seek remedies in those situations. This Thesis proceeds to conduct a comparative study on the U.S. shareholder proposal regime, and reviews current regime of Taiwan and its procedural remedies. Regarding the substantive rules, this Thesis suggests that the eligibility thresholds be lowered and the scope of proposals be interpreted more broadly based on shareholder proposals’ ability to increase communications with companies and to promote shareholder democracy. On the other hand, the restrictions on and the disclosure of the form of proposals and the proponent’s attendance requirement should be strictly regulated. Besides, this Thesis also suggests adding new provisions that would allow companies to exclude proposals to address with Taiwanese practices. As for the remedies for shareholders, this Thesis examines the government agency’s power to intervene and the judicial practice under Taiwanese current law. It points out the insufficient ex-ante remedies and questions the jurisprudence in determining the application of preliminary injunctions, especially when the board illegally excludes the proposals. After observing the U.S. ex-ante remedies, this Thesis suggests that the FSC review the proposals through administrative guidance as the first layer of shareholders’ remedies and that, when determining the application of preliminary injunctions, the courts should focus on the likelihood of plaintiff prevailing on merits in order to improve the efficiency of judicial review.