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標題: | 股東表決權限制之規範模式─以交叉持股與利益衝突為例 A Study on the Regulatory Approaches of the Restriction of Shareholders' Voting Rights: Taking Cross Shareholding and the Conflict of Interests as Examples |
其他標題: | A Study on the Regulatory Approaches of the Restriction of Shareholders' Voting Rights: Taking Cross Shareholding and the Conflict of Interests as Examples |
作者: | 黃郁真 Yu-Zhen Huang |
指導教授: | 邵慶平 Cing-Ping Shao |
關鍵字: | 表決權限制,股東權,交叉持股,關係企業,利益衝突, Restriction of Voting Right,Shareholders' Right,Cross-shareholding,Affiliated Companies,Conflict of Interests, |
出版年 : | 2022 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 決權為股東參與公司經營、促進公司治理重要的管道,但我國卻有不少將限制股東表決權作為手段的法規。本文旨在檢視限制表決權之規範是否妥適,包含法規之立法目的為何、限制表決權的方式為何、限制表決權能否達成立法目的。因此本文以交叉持股企業與利益衝突股東的表決權限制為具體的檢視對象、整理股東表決權限制規範模式之種類,並提出對我國股東表決權限制規範之建議。針對「交叉持股企業」之表決權行使,我國現行法對於形式控制從屬公司與實質控制從屬公司採取不同規範方式。形式從屬公司持有控制公司的股份會事先被認定為無表決權,但實質從屬公司卻得以自由行使控制公司的表決權而不會受到任何限制。然而,無論是從交叉持股可能產生的弊端、公司法第 179 條第 2 項之立法目的,或是美國法與日本法之制度來看,皆不應放任實質從屬公司自由行使表決權而無任何限制。針對另一個例子─「利益衝突股東」之表決權行使,不管是美國法抑或是日本法皆不像我國採取全面排除、事前限制表決權的規範方式,而是允許股東自由行使表決權,或者藉由侵害程度較輕微的、事後的方式限制表決權,分別凸顯了限制有利益衝突股東的表決權的正當性並不像董事這麼足夠,以及事前限制方式的侷限之處。限制股東表決權的規範模式應可分為「事前限制模式」、「事後限制模式」與「自由行使模式」。本文認為立法限制股東的表決權時應考量到「不同規範模式的特性」與「立法目的與表決權限制的關聯性」,再決定採取何種規範模式。 Voting rights serve as an important way for shareholders to participate in the operation of companies and to boost corporate governance. However, there exist regulations that contain restriction of shareholders’ voting right in Taiwan. This study aims to examine whether these regulations are appropriate, including the legitimacy of its legislative purposes, the categories of restriction, and whether the restriction of voting rights can help achieve the legislative purposes. Therefore, this study takes cross-holding industries and shareholders that have the conflict of interests as examples, listing different regulation approaches of restriction of voting rights and proposing some suggestions. In terms of cross-holding industries’ voting rights, the legislators adopt different regulatory approaches towards material affiliates and substantial affiliates. If a controlling company’s shares are owned by its material affiliate, such share is not entitled to vote. In contrast, if a controlling company’s shares are owned by its substantial affiliate, such share is entitled to vote. Nevertheless, no matter what perspectives we take from, substantial affiliates’ voting rights shall also be regulated; otherwise, directors in a controlling company may misuse a corporate investment to perpetuate themselves in power, and thus the legislative purpose cannot be achieved. In terms of shareholders that have the conflict of interests, unlike regulations in Taiwan, Model Business Coporation Law, Delaware General Corporation Law in United States still allow these shareholders to exercise their voting rights. In addition, Business Law in Japan only indirectly restricts shareholders’ voting rights through judicial relief system. It demonstrates that when it comes to the conflict of interests, restrictions on shareholders is not of high legitimacy as restrictions on directors, and emphasizes the shortcoming of a rule-based approach. The regulatory approaches of restrictions of shareholders’ voting right can be separated into “a rule-based approach”, “a standard-based approach”, and “an unengaged approach”. Legislators should consider the features of different approaches and the degree of relevance between the legislative purposes and restriction of voting rights when determining which approach to choose from. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/83077 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU202210088 |
全文授權: | 同意授權(全球公開) |
顯示於系所單位: | 法律學系 |
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ntu-111-1.pdf | 4.03 MB | Adobe PDF | 檢視/開啟 |
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