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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 吳澤玫(Tse-Mei Wu) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Min-Kuan Wang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 汪旻寬 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-11-23T09:03:59Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2021-11-08 | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-11-23T09:03:59Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2021-11-08 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2021-09-22 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 吳澤玫〈從同婚爭議論公共理性的完備性〉，《歐美研究》第五十卷第三期（2020）：523-569。 謝孟穎〈反同婚公投辯論：牧師陳思豪挺平權發言全記錄：上帝給予陽光不分好人壞人，法律不也是這樣？〉，《風傳媒》，2018年11月5日，網址：https://www.storm.mg/article/599775 謝孟穎〈禁墮胎公投捲土重來！宗教界人士狂批人工流產婦女「暴力」：把孩子殺了，像黑道殺人類〉，《風傳媒》，2020年3月27日，網址：https://www.storm.mg/article/2453844?mode=whole Audi, Robert, Nicholas Wolterstorff. Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate. London: Rowman Littlefield Publishers, 1997. Barry, Brian. Justice as Impartiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Bell, Derek. ‘‘How can Political Liberals be Environmentalists?’’ Political Studies. 50 (2002): 703-724. Brake, Elizabeth. ‘‘Minimal Marriage: What Political Liberalism Implies for Marriage Law.’’ Ethics. 120, 2 (2010): 302-337. Gaus, Gerald. Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. --- The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Gaus, Gerald, Kevin Vallier. “The Roles of Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity: The Implications of Convergence, Asymmetry and Political Institutions.” Philosophy Social Criticism. 35, 1–2 (2009): 51–76. Greenawalt, Kent. Religious Convictions and Political Choice. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Gutmann, Amy, Dennis Thompson. ‘‘Moral Disagreement in a Democracy.’’ Social Philosophy and Policy. 12, 1 (1995): 87–110. --- The Spirit of Compromise: Why Governing Demands It and Campaigning Undermines It. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014. Macedo, Stephen. ‘‘In Defense of Liberal Public Reason: Are Slavery and Abortion Hard Cases?’’ American Journal of Jurisprudence. 42, 1 (1997): 1-29. Neal, Patrick. “Is Political Liberalism Hostile to Religion?” Reflections on Rawls: An Assessment of his Legacy. Edited by Shaun Young. New York: Routledge, 2009. Pp. 153-175. ---‘‘Rawls, Abortion, and Public Reason.’’ Journal of Church and State. 56, 2 (2014): 323-346. Peter, Fabienne. ‘‘Political Legitimacy.’’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford University, 2017. URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/legitimacy/>. Quong, Jonathan. Liberalism Without Perfection. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. ---“What Is the Point of Public Reason.’’ Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. 170, 3 (2014): 545-553. --- ‘‘Public Reason.’’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford University, 2018. URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/public-reason/>. Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971. ---Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. ---‘‘Introduction to the Paperback Edition.’’ Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. Pp. xxxvii-lxii. ---“The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.” The University of Chicago Law Review. 64, 3 (1997): 765-807. Reidy, David. “Rawls's Wide View of Public Reason: Not Wide Enough.” Res Publica. 6, 1 (2000): 49-72. Sandel, Michael. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. ---Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009. Schwartzman, Micah. “The Completeness of Public Reason.” Politics, Philosophy Economic. 3, 2 (2004): 191-220. Smart, J. J. C., Bernard Williams. Utilitarianism: For and Against. England: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Solum, Lawrence. ‘‘Inclusive Public Reason.’’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 75 (1994): 217-231. Stivers, Andrew, Andrew Valls. “Same-sex Marriage and the Regulation of Language.” Politics, Philosophy and Economics. 6, 2 (2007): 237–253. Thomson, Judith. ‘‘A Defense of Abortion.’’ Philosophy and Public Affairs. 1, 1 (1971): 47-66. Vallier, Kevin. Liberalism and Public Faith: Beyond Separation. New York: Routledge, 2014. Van Schoelandt, Chad. “Justification, Coercion, and the Place of Public Reason.” Philosophical Studies. 172, 4 (2015): 1031–1050. Williams, Andrew. “The Alleged Incompleteness of Public Reason.” Res Publica. 6, 2 (2000): 199-211. Williams, Bernard. ‘‘Internal and External Reasons.’’ Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Pp. 101-113. Williams, Jeremy. ‘‘Public Reason and Prenatal Moral Status.’’ The Journal of Ethics. 19, 1 (2015): 23-52. Young, Iris Marion. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/79570 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本文的目的是探討能適當地處理民主社會中的政治歧見的公共理性觀點。在當代的民主社會中，公民抱持許多對立且不相容的價值觀，這使得公民經常對於社會制度有分歧的意見。於是，如何對於社會制度做出確定且合理的判斷就成為民主社會需要處理的難題。對此，羅爾斯的公共理性觀點提出可能的回答：這個觀點要求公民在公共討論中避免使用基於全面性學說的理由，而是使用可以合理期待所有公民都會接受的理由。這有助於縮小公民之間的政治歧見，進而讓公民做出具有正當性的公共決策，卻也引來許多批評。 本文將先梳理羅爾斯在《政治自由主義》中對於公共理性的論證，以及他在《政治自由主義》之後所做出的調整。接著，本文把公共理性所面臨的批評分為「不完備性的挑戰」與「不合理排除的挑戰」，並且分別做出討論。以不完備性的挑戰而言，本文認為在公共理性的限制下，雖然公民可能無法支持相同的結論或做出確定的判斷，但公共理性的支持者可以要求公民擱置無法以政治價值回答的問題，並且以二階決策程序來做出決策。以不合理排除的挑戰而言，本文認為損害人格完整性與擱置真理的批評都指出了羅爾斯的公共理性觀點需要被修改。最後，本文將討論幾個可能的替代觀點，並且指出這些觀點的洞見與缺點，進而提出「公共理性的開放觀點」作為適當的替代觀點。這個觀點保留了某些羅爾斯的公共理性觀點的洞見，也結合了某些其他觀點的特性，從而有助於改善羅爾斯的公共理性觀點所面臨的問題。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2022-11-23T09:03:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-1709202109442400.pdf: 1613895 bytes, checksum: 380e78af7b20ccb892354bdaee52b33d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2021 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 導論 1 第一章 羅爾斯的公共理性 9 第一節 公共理性的論證 9 第二節 放寬公共理性的限制 22 第二章 不完備性的挑戰 29 第一節 非結論性 30 第二節 不確定性 38 第三章 不合理排除的挑戰 53 第一節 不公平的問題 53 第二節 損害人格完整性的問題 58 第三節 擱置真理的問題 64 第四章 更包容的公共理性觀點 75 第一節 其他學者的替代觀點 75 第二節 公共理性的開放觀點 85 結論 97 參考書目 105 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 論公共理性的理想與侷限 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | On the Ideal and Limitations of Public Reason | en |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 109-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 謝世民(Hsin-Tsai Liu),吳豐維(Chih-Yang Tseng) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 公共理性,正當性,政治價值,不完備性,羅爾斯, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Public Reason,Legitimacy,Political values,Incompleteness,John Rawls, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 108 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202103230 | |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2021-09-23 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 文學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 哲學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 哲學系 | |
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