CEO能力不確定性對資訊不確定性之影響

Abstract

資訊不確定性的程度會影響債權人與股東對投資所要求的風險貼水。市場對於CEO能力的不確定性是影響公司資訊不確定性的主要原因之一。根據Pan et al. (2015)，CEO工作年間影響市場認知CEO能力的速度，故本研究著重在CEO工作年間的影響。實證結果發現，隨著CEO上任期間越長，資訊不確定性越低，且資訊不確定下降幅度於前3年最為明顯，而後緩慢下降；但對於上任期間較長的CEO，其就任期間對資訊不確定性的影響較小。

A firm’s degree of information uncertainty affects the risk premiums of both its debt and equity investors. The information of a firm’s CEO ability is one of the main sources affecting firm uncertainty. According to Pan et al. (2015), CEO tenure affects market learning in CEO ability. The main purpose of this study therefore focuses on the effect of CEO tenure on firm’s information uncertainty. The results of the empirical show that the degree of a firm’s information uncertainty increases when a new CEO takeover. The longer the CEO tenure, the less the degree of information uncertainty. Additionally, significant decline of information uncertainty happens within the first 3 years.