雙層股權結構之應用—以控制權角度出發

Abstract

我國公司法第356條之7開放閉鎖性股份有限公司得使用複數表決權股建立雙層股權結構，以維護公司創辦人對公司的控制力。這樣的法制彈性於2018年7月經立法院通過公司法修正案，第157條開放非公開發行公司亦得使用複數表決權股，然而主管機關立基於避免萬年董監事之立場，仍抱持著相對保守的看法，尚未開放公開發行公司使用複數表決權股。 因此本文將從控制權談起，討論握有公司控制權之目的及意義，以突顯維護控制權機制之重要性。其後切入探討雙層股權結構制度之優點缺失、案例及各項爭議，並針對缺失提出可能的條款設計，以降低使用此制度之風險。從而認為制度本身並無所謂優劣，只要對於弊端及風險能加以降低或防免，使機制利用效益大於缺失則仍不失為一個好機制。於文末將回歸我國法並針對現行法制提出相關建議，以期待未來此機制能更加地被活用，並開放初次公開發行公司亦有使用之機會，使創業者在公司進入成長期時，不因缺少資金而致生商業成果需拱手讓人之飲恨結果，並使創業者迴避可能面對的公司成長與維護控制權之抉擇問題。

In order to seek out the most suitable ownership structure and fund for companies, in 2018, The Legislative Yuan approved The Drafts of Amendment to The Corporation Law, allowing private companies to establish dual class stock structure by using multiple voting shares. However, to avoid “eternal board of directors” (They can hardly be replaced), this amendment isn’t active for public companies. This thesis argues that, using multiple voting shares should not only open to private companies but also IPO companies, due to investors’ freedom of choice. This thesis starts from discussing the goal and meaning of corporate control. Then, this thesis discusses advantages, disadvantages, cases, and controversy of dual-class stock structure, proposing the possible sunset provisions design to decrease the risk of utilizing this system. In the end of this thesis, it advises the scope of utility of dual-class stock structure, recommending some suggestions to existing laws, hoping that the suggestions provided by this thesis will make flexible use of the system.