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Social Governance Mechanisms in Market Structure Transition of China-- Case Studies of Four Types
market structure transition,social governance,institutional inclusion,institutional penetration,party-royalty regime,
|Publication Year :||2016|
The structural transformation of market economy in China results in a systematic rearrangement of political and economical resources. This rearrangement triggered community actions and reactions from social forces, thus bringing new challenges and crisis. Using institutionalized mechanisms to resolve these challenges and crisis, and maintain the order in political society becomes a necessity for grassroots society governance and also forms the basis of the stable continuation of a more grandeur political power regime. Within the vast territories of China, there were a lot of different institutional practice, application, choice and innovation that existed. Some of these cases were within the background of market structure transformation, doing institutional reform under the threat of an expanding social crisis, yet achieved an extraordinary social governance performance, making it a executing template for provincial level to central level governments. These cases went through an exceptional long and complete path in an institutional sense.
But the institutional reforms, its governance performance, path, mechanism and forms in different places are usually different. What kind of institutions do these paths result in? Why are there differences? How do they form and what is the mechanism of them? What trend and limitations do they face? And what connections and meanings are there between the grassroots institutions and the grand regime institution? This article tries to compare and deduct between the different types of institutions through research, field studies, participation, reflection and imagination. And tries to combine the two dimensions of regime-society boundary and grassroots social culture. With references from institution economics theory, we use ideas of the dependence of political and economical resources of regime and abstractness of culture consciousness of communities as guidance to distinguish four types of grassroots social layout background, which includes “abstract dependence”, “particular dependence”, “particular independence” and “abstract independence”.
These four different social layout background types become different limitation conditions in institutional decision-making of different grassroots regimes, showing different traits between these mechanisms. Such as inclusion, penetration, embeddedness and exclusion. Meanwhile, they also define how would the grassroots communities act. Whether the institutional decision-making under limitations can form a matching relationship between the grassroots social layout background and its community actions become the key to grassroots social governance performance. The governance type of these matching relationships are: “totalism of regulate penetration”, “subcontract of Guanxi penetration”, “traditionalism of Guanxi inclusion” and “rule by law of regulate inclusion”. This framework forms the frame of reference for comprehension of grassroots social governance.
According to the four different types of grassroots social layout background and mechanism, we selected four ideal type cases in this article as examples for each. One is a north-eastern old industrial base, one is a poor county in Shaanxi province, one is a clan society in Jiangxi, and one is from the more developed areas of Guangdong. All these four cases had encountered major social crisis that might spread upwards and outwards. All of them undertook the decision-making of institutional reform, and achieved immense results in social governance through one of these four governance mechanism types. We examined the execution process of these four mechanisms, and try to show that the decision-making and execution of grassroots level governance need, to some extent, basal level discretion that differ from place to place. And the stability and limitation of grand political institution also affect the performance of micro governance at grassroots level.
But the inherent properties of political institution also result in the conflicting tensions between the grand political institutions and grassroots micro governance. Back to the logics of party-royalty regime, the ways that political institutions try to resolve conflict are leaning toward “dependent” way or even “totalism” way, and appear as the concentration of power in central level and direct infiltration and control of grassroots level. The insight and contribution of this article lies in the types that transcends grandeur institution and special case narratives, providing a theoretical perspective that has both typological meaning and policy value. And at the same time, we try to display the party-royalty regime and the common logic of political development in modern China through the process of grassroots governance and its relationship with grand political institution.
|Appears in Collections:||政治學系|
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