請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/74837完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 陳業寧(Yehning Chen) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yu-Cheng Chen | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 陳昱誠 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T09:08:33Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2021-01-15 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2020-01-15 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2019-11-06 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Aldatmaz, S., Ouimet, P., and Van Wesep, E.D., 2018. The option to quit: The effect of employee stock options on turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 127 (1): 136–151.
Babenko, I., and Tserlukevich, Y., 2009. Analyzing the tax benefits from employee stock options. The Journal of Finance, vol. 64 (4): 1797–1825. Chang, X., Fu, K., Low, A., and Zhang, W., 2015. Non-executive employee stock options and corporate innovation. Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 115 (1): 168–188. Coles, J.L., Daniel, N.D., and Naveen, L., 2006. Managerial incentives and risk-taking. Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 79 (2): 431–468. Garvey, G., Milbourn, T., 2003. Incentive compensation when executives can hedge the market: Evidence of relative performance evaluation in the cross section. The Journal of Finance, vol. 58 (4): 1557-1581. Hayes, R.M., Lemmon, M., and Qiu, M., 2012. Stock options and managerial incentives for risk taking: Evidence from FAS 123R. Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 105 (1): 174–190. Hochberg, Y.V., and Lindsey, L., 2010. Incentives, targeting, and firm performance: An analysis of non-executive stock options. Review of Financial Studies, vol. 23 (11): 4148–4186. Jensen, M.C., and Meckling, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 3 (4): 305–360. Murphy, K.J., 2003. Stock-based pay in new economy firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 34 (1-3): 129-147. Oyer, P., and Schaefer, S., 2005. Why do some firms give stock options to all employees?: An empirical examination of alternative theories. Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 76 (1): 99–133. Ross, S.A., 2004. Compensation, incentives, and the duality of risk aversion and riskiness. The Journal of Finance, vol. 59 (1): 207–225. Shue, K., and Townsend, R.R., 2017. How do quasi‐random option grants affect CEO risk‐taking? The Journal of Finance, vol. 72 (6): 2551–2588. Tzioumis, K., 2007. Why do firms adopt CEO stock options? Evidence from the United States. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 68 (1): 100-111. Zhang, Y., 2009. Are debt and incentive compensation substitutes in controlling the free cash flow agency problem? Financial Management, vol. 38 (3): 507–541. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/74837 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 由於股票選擇權有凸性效果，越高的股價波動程度將提升選擇權內在價值，許多實證文章發現給予經理人的選擇權價值越多則公司風險越大。但因為有文章發現給予員工選擇權將提高創新意願而增加專利權的產出，公司風險的提昇可能來自於員工選擇權的給予。考慮到公司常常同時發放選擇權給予員工以及經理人，若實證文章未納入兩者其中之一將會給出錯誤的結論。本篇論文資料取自Execucomp資料庫，資料包含1996年到2005年的美國公司，探討選擇權價值對公司風險的影響。在納入了給予員工的選擇權價值以及經理人的選擇權價值之後，發現員工選擇權價值才是公司風險提高的主要來源，並且發現員工選擇權價值對公司風險的提高是經由創新意願的上升這個管道。然而給予經理人的選擇權價值並不會顯著影響公司整體風險，並且也不顯著改變舉債規模以及資本投入規模。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Although previous studies have found that giving CEOs stock options will increase stock return volatility due to the fact that the features of options give incentive to CEOs to raise the overall risk of the company, I discovered that it’s the value of options given to workers that drives the increase in volatility because employee stock options induce innovation and CEO stock options, however, don’t have any impact on stock return volatility. Since a firm is quite likely to grant stock options to its workers and executives simultaneously, ignoring the effect of any one of them will lead to a wrong conclusion. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-17T09:08:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-108-R06723050-1.pdf: 1403842 bytes, checksum: cd2d5de4fb942e6f013d88b66a7b2e27 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書 i
誌謝 ii 中文摘要 iii 英文摘要 iv 第壹章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機與目的 1 第二節 相關文獻 2 第三節 假說與模型設定 3 第貳章 資料來源、變數選擇及處理 4 第一節 資料來源 5 第二節 控制變數選擇 5 第三節 資料處理 5 第參章 研究結果 8 第一節 初步迴歸 8 第二節 員工創新提高股價波動性 11 第三節 公司經理人的決策改變 14 第肆章 內生性問題處理 16 第一節 主要模型 16 第二節 員工創新意願 18 第三節 經理人的風險決策 20 第伍章 穩健性檢驗 22 第陸章 結論 24 參考文獻 25 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 風險決策 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 股價波動度 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 風險誘因 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 員工選擇權 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 經理人選擇權 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | employee stock options | en |
| dc.subject | Stock return volatility | en |
| dc.subject | risky decisions | en |
| dc.subject | risk-taking incentive | en |
| dc.subject | CEO stock options | en |
| dc.title | 經理人與非經理人選擇權對股價報酬波動的影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Effect of Executive Stock Options and Non-executive
Stock Options on Stock Return Volatility | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 108-1 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳彥行(Yanshing Chen),張晏誠(Yencheng chang) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 股價波動度,員工選擇權,經理人選擇權,風險誘因,風險決策, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Stock return volatility,employee stock options,CEO stock options,risk-taking incentive,risky decisions, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 26 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201904234 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2019-11-06 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 財務金融學系 | |
文件中的檔案：
| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-108-1.pdf 未授權公開取用 | 1.37 MB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件，除了特別指名其著作權條款之外，均受到著作權保護，並且保留所有的權利。