Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/74837
Title: | 經理人與非經理人選擇權對股價報酬波動的影響 The Effect of Executive Stock Options and Non-executive Stock Options on Stock Return Volatility |
Authors: | Yu-Cheng Chen 陳昱誠 |
Advisor: | 陳業寧(Yehning Chen) |
Keyword: | 股價波動度,員工選擇權,經理人選擇權,風險誘因,風險決策, Stock return volatility,employee stock options,CEO stock options,risk-taking incentive,risky decisions, |
Publication Year : | 2019 |
Degree: | 碩士 |
Abstract: | 由於股票選擇權有凸性效果,越高的股價波動程度將提升選擇權內在價值,許多實證文章發現給予經理人的選擇權價值越多則公司風險越大。但因為有文章發現給予員工選擇權將提高創新意願而增加專利權的產出,公司風險的提昇可能來自於員工選擇權的給予。考慮到公司常常同時發放選擇權給予員工以及經理人,若實證文章未納入兩者其中之一將會給出錯誤的結論。本篇論文資料取自Execucomp資料庫,資料包含1996年到2005年的美國公司,探討選擇權價值對公司風險的影響。在納入了給予員工的選擇權價值以及經理人的選擇權價值之後,發現員工選擇權價值才是公司風險提高的主要來源,並且發現員工選擇權價值對公司風險的提高是經由創新意願的上升這個管道。然而給予經理人的選擇權價值並不會顯著影響公司整體風險,並且也不顯著改變舉債規模以及資本投入規模。 Although previous studies have found that giving CEOs stock options will increase stock return volatility due to the fact that the features of options give incentive to CEOs to raise the overall risk of the company, I discovered that it’s the value of options given to workers that drives the increase in volatility because employee stock options induce innovation and CEO stock options, however, don’t have any impact on stock return volatility. Since a firm is quite likely to grant stock options to its workers and executives simultaneously, ignoring the effect of any one of them will lead to a wrong conclusion. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/74837 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU201904234 |
Fulltext Rights: | 有償授權 |
Appears in Collections: | 財務金融學系 |
Files in This Item:
File | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|
ntu-108-1.pdf Restricted Access | 1.37 MB | Adobe PDF |
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.