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標題: | 初探機構投資人之盡職治理―以與受託人義務之調和為中心 An Exploratory Study on Institutional Investors Stewardship: Focusing on the Relationship with Fiduciary Duty |
作者: | Yi-Ting Liao 廖翊婷 |
指導教授: | 曾宛如(Wang-Ruu Tseng) |
關鍵字: | 機構投資人,盡職治理,受託人義務,股東行動主義,機構投資人積極主義,代理理論,管家理論,二重治理,雙重治理,公司治理, Stewardship,Institutional Investors,Institutional Investors Stewardship,Shareholder Stewardship,Fiduciary Duty,Corporate Engagement,Shareholder Activism,Agency Theory,Stewardship Theory,Double Agency Problem, |
出版年 : | 2020 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 隨著近年機構投資人於資本市場的興起,機構投資人之於被投資公司的公司治理角色職能受到熱烈關注與討論。英國於2010年發布全球第一部機構投資人盡職治理守則(The UK Stewardship Code),隨後各國紛紛依據其資本市場與公司治理狀況頒布相關盡職治理原則。我國亦於2016年由證券交易所公司治理中心公布我國第一版機構投資人盡職治理守則,採遵循否則解釋(comply-or-explain)之模式,目標在於引導機構投資人基於對客戶、最終受益人之受託人義務滿足其投資利益的同時,關注被投資公司的營運狀況,積極運用機構投資人身為股東的權利,參與公司治理。 然而,機構投資人盡職治理是否可以逕以受託人義務為法理基礎,並非無疑。質言之,何以得本於機構投資人對客戶、最終受益人的受託人義務,要求機構投資人積極關注被投資公司、參與公司治理﹖盡職治理要求與受託人義務的關係為何,是否有潛在衝突﹖盡職治理與公司治理又有怎樣的關聯﹖為本文提出並嘗試處理與探究的問題。本文認為盡職治理概念與基礎應先予以釐清與確立,機構投資人參與公司治理始有被有效加強的可能。 本文從兩個視角切入―機構投資人身為股東與機構投資人身為受託人―並輔以比較法觀點展開論述。首先,本文爬梳股東行動主義與公司治理的關係與變遷;接著,聚焦於機構投資人參與公司治理,深入探討盡職治理與受託人義務的關係與互動,本文認為現行受託人義務與盡職治理要求存在差異,兩者應予以釐清,並指出機構投資人的受託人性格是有盡職治理發展的空間與可能,而資訊之揭露應為重要配套機制。二重治理觀點則可以將機構投資人所涉及之投資管理關係(對客戶、最終受益人)與公司治理關係(對被投資公司)結合觀察,為吾人就盡職治理與公司治理之關聯提供另一觀點與說明;最後,本文借鏡英國、美國及其他國際組織對於機構投資人參與公司治理之經驗、研究與發展,希冀能為我國機構投資人盡職治理之發展提供不一樣的觀察視角與思索脈絡,充實公司治理之一環。 As becoming the dominant owners of listed companies in many developed markets, institutional investors have been under increasing pressure to act as responsible shareholders. Awaring this global trend, Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Center has published the first version of Taiwan Institutional Investors Stewardship Code in 2016. According to the Code, institutional investors are expected to actively engage with investee companies based on their fiduciary duties to their clients or beneficial owners. However, institutional investors’ interpretations of their fiduciary duties may shape their approaches to corporate stewardship and engagement envisioned and expected by the Code. In other words, whether the notion of stewardship can be based on fiduciary duty without any controdiction is questionable. Thus, debates on the relationship between institutional investors stewardship and their fiduciary duties emerge. This article, by referring to foreign and domestic studies and reports, first points out that institutional investors stewardship and their fiduciary duties exist differences. It is harsh for institutional investors to develop their stewardship totally based on their fiduciary duties. Secondly, the article argues that there may be possible legal bases regarding stewardship with reference to viewpoints on the interaction, learning process as well as development between Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory. Also, information disclosure plays a key role in the stewardship of institutional investors. Furthermore, the double agency issue can provide insights with regards to the relationship between institutional investors stewardship and corporate governance. Thirdly, the article attempts to explore insights from experiences and the latest development the UK and the US have regarding the issue of institutional investors stewardship. Finally, back to Taiwan, the article highlights what the core challenges of the Stewardship Code practical application will be, which fundamentally relates to the tension between stewardship and fiduciary duty. The debate and exploration will continue, and be relevant to the ongoing revisions of the Stewardship Code and policy clarifications of the nature of fiduciary duty by the authority. The article encourages people to consider what role institutional investors should have in stewardship, which may not be directly relevant to their fiduciary duties; nevertheless, institutional investors, as trustees, still have potential for stewardship. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/73349 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU202004409 |
全文授權: | 有償授權 |
顯示於系所單位: | 法律學系 |
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