2007-2009金融危機和監管改革對於銀行放款行為之影響：從資本與流動性對於貸款收入比之效果探討

Abstract

在2007-2009年金融危機爆發後，各國銀行受到了更加嚴厲的法規規範，例如：「陶德-法蘭克華爾街改革與消費者保護法案」和「巴賽爾協定三」等。本研究使用「家庭房貸披露法」下所蒐集之數據，運用迴歸分析，探討銀行之放款行為是否會受到監管改革和金融海嘯之衝擊而有所改變，比較2007-2009年金融危機發生前後之差異性。本研究實證結果顯示在金融海嘯後之樣本年度，法規對於資本適足率和流動性之要求，分別對於銀行之放款行為有不同層面的影響，在資本適足率方面，當銀行擁有較多（少）之資本時，其會選擇放寬（緊縮）借貸的標準，較願意（不願意）承擔借款人之風險；反之，在流動性比率的部分，銀行會選擇提升流動性比率，而仍然緊縮其放貸的標準，因此，不論是資本適足率抑或是流動性比率，銀行確實受到法規改革和金融海嘯之影響，而導致放款行為與以往有所不同。此外，本研究也可作為監管機關檢視修法成效之參考。

Following the 2007-2009 financial crisis, banks are now subject to more stringent regulations, such as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and Basel III. This study mainly examines whether the impact of regulation reforms on capital and liquidity correlates to banks’ lending behavior after this severe financial crisis. My empirical findings show that the effect of capital on lending behavior is different from the effect of liquidity. The results suggest that banks loosen lending standards when they have more capital during the post-crisis period. In contrast, banks with a high liquidity ratio still tighten their credit supply. In brief, banks’ lending behavior is indeed influenced by the regulation reforms and the 2007-2009 financial crisis. This study may also provide some implications for policy making.