亞洲開發銀行法與政策改革援助的發展與侷限

Abstract

本文試圖對亞洲開發銀行的法與政策改革援助提出一個問題，這些援助計畫是否忽略了法治的政治面向？藉由爬梳法與發展研究領域的流變後，筆者整理出法治概念蘊含的政治性是如何在法與發展研究中被分離出來，並且於實際的司法改革中，看見司法運作的多面向具備足夠的空間，讓捐助者得以有意無意地選擇避開司法獨立這種吃力不討好的道路。然後轉向探討亞洲開發銀行的組成與結構，在在透露出亞洲開發銀行強烈的非政治性格，使得其法與政策改革援助，無論是銀行政策的歷史發展，或是從項目中所有計畫進行整體觀察，都可以發現深陷非政治性的原則之中。而這樣的走向不僅是亞洲開發銀行因為其組織作風的選擇，也有著權力結構、歷史因素的侷限。甚至在亞洲開發銀行之外，法律改革援助的評估困境、法與發展領域理論上的侷限也從根本上影響了捐助者選擇投入具有政治性質的法律改革援助之可能性。

This thesis attempts to ask a question about the Law and Policy Reform in Asian Development Bank (ADB): do these projects ignore the political aspect of the rule of law? By combing through Law and Development studies, the author charts how the political aspect of the rule of law has been separated, and how, in justice reform, the multifaceted nature of judiciary leaves ample room for donors to consciously or unconsciously choose to bypass the unpalatable path of judicial independence. It then turns to the history and structure of the Asian Development Bank, which reveals its strong apolitical character, making its Law and Policy Reform, both in terms of the historical progress of banking policy and in terms of the program as a whole, mired in apolitical principles. This direction is not only the result of the Asian Development Bank's organizational style, but also of its power structure and historical factors. Even outside the ADB, the difficulty of evaluating legal reform and the theoretical failure of the Law and Development fundamentally affect the possibility of donors choosing to invest in legal reform that is more political in nature.