內線交易之法律經濟分析及刑法問題

Abstract

「內線交易應否禁止」，歷來肯定說、否定說兩種見解早已爭論不休。其中亦有以「法律經濟分析方法」論述此問題之方法。而本文認為，由於內線交易並未牽涉到「基本人權」等價值，只純粹考量「證券交易市場的保護」，故以「效率」及「總體經濟價值」為考量的法律經濟分析方法，用來分析內線交易應否禁止，應無不可。然而，縱使以經濟學之角度分析內線交易，本文認為，本於內線交易所帶來的負面影響，確實多過於正面意義，且本於市場之公平性，本文認為仍應禁止內線交易。

然而，「應禁止內線交易」與「內線交易是否應課以刑責」是兩個完全不同層次問題。一般認為內線交易罪係屬於「抽象危險犯」，而危險犯係屬於前置化處罰，且刑罰又為最嚴厲的制裁工具，國家應當審慎使用，以避免過度侵害人權。否則可能違反刑法的最後手段性、明確性原則，並背離了除罪化趨勢。

此外將內線交易入罪化，不符合比例原則之「必要性」與「衡平性」，可能會有違憲之虞。而內線交易處以刑責，既不符刑法之「構成要件」：即行為人可能欠缺「認識與意欲」，亦欠缺「不法性」與「期待可能性」。此外，內線交易之刑責亦不符「罪責原則」(刑責過重)故本文認為，內線交易處以刑責並不符合刑法之理論，故應廢止刑責，改以民事賠償及懲罰性賠償金、行政罰等即為已足。

內線交易涉及到「持有說」及「利用說」之爭議，現行法實務多數採「持有說」，然而本文認為，不能僅以「追訴成效」之考量，就斷然以符合「形式要件」，即可「推定」構成內線交易，再由被告舉反證推翻。如此不但侵害被告權益甚鉅，亦違反刑事訴訟法「罪疑唯輕」、「無罪推定」、「不自證己罪」…等相關基本原則。如上所述，內線交易應改採「利用說」，由檢察官主動負舉證責任，主動證明被告有「利用」內線消息 (即知悉消息與買賣股票間有「因果關係」)，因此本文採「利用說」之見解。

關於豁免條款之「種類」，由於目前豁免條款之草案，只承認「預定交易計畫」一種類型，似乎仍有不足。而「實務判決」累積之抗辯類型，應可承認為另外之豁免事由。例如：補足董監事持股之不足、受主管機關指示賣出股票、遭金融機構斷頭、有預定交易計劃、依財務分析報告做成之決定、配合政策買進股票、公司併購行為…等。由於皆具有買賣之「理由」，故應屬得豁免之類型。縱使現行法或草案未明文規定，仍應解為不構成內線交易，方為妥適。目前豁免條款之相關草案尚未通過，期應盡速通過，以使被告之權利獲得確實之保障。

Insider trading law is controversial and has pros and cons. Some try to analyze this issue in economic analysis way. I think it’s proper to use economic analysis way to analyze insider trading law because it has nothing to do with human rights but only market efficiency and protection. And I think we should still ban insider trading even in economic analysis way according to its bad influence to the market and market fairness.

Whether insider trading should have criminal responsibility or not is another question. Insider trading is an abstract crime of danger. So insider trading law with criminal responsibility may infringe upon human rights if we don’t use it carefully. We should take ultima ratio of penalty into consideration.

Insider trading law may be unconstitutional because it does not meet the requirements of Principle of Proportionality. Besides, insider trading law may not meet the requirements of 'Tatbestand'、'Rechtswidrigkeit'、possible expectation and the guilt principle. So I think we should decriminalize insider trading and use the civil compensation and administrative sanction instead.

In the Insider Trading 'Possession vs. Use' Debate, the majority of courts take the 'Possession' side. But according to the 'Nemo tenetur、'In dubio pro reo' and 'Nemo tenetur se Ipsum Accusare', we should take the 'Use' side in spite of the prosecution efficiency. The prosecutor should prove that the defendant 'use' the insider information.

There is only one type of insider trading exemption clause proposed by Executive Yuan (R.O.C) and legislators. According to the judgement of courts, we should recognize such as 'The requirements of the stockholding of directors and supervisors'、'The competent authority asks to sell the stocks'、'liquidation of stocks'、'The affirmative defense clause like rule 10b5-1'、'Buy or sell according to the financial analysis report' and 'The merger of corporation' as other types of insider trading exemption clauses as soon as possible.