企業舉債程度對管理階層薪酬及員工薪資之影響

Abstract

本論文探討台灣上市櫃公司於2008年至2015年間，公司舉債程度對薪資的影響。研究發現公司舉債程度越高，員工薪資越低，但對管理階層薪酬較無影響。舉債程度與員工薪資的負相關在研發比率高的公司及傳產業較不顯著，但在金融海嘯期間較顯著。本文結果支持台灣公司傾向於利用負債來壓低員工的薪資。

The paper focuses on the relation between leverage and either managerial wage or average employee wage, using the sample consisting of all the listed firms but excluding financial firm in TEJ database from 2008 to 2015. The results show there is a negative relation between firm leverage and average employee wage in Taiwan, but no significant relation between leverage and managerial compensation. The negative effect of leverage on average employee wage will be weaker in firms with higher R&D ratio and in nontechnology firms, but will be stronger during the periods of financial crisis. The results of this paper imply that in Taiwan a high leverage ratio helps employers to gain bargaining advantage over employees when negotiating wage.