《莊子》知識論研究

Abstract

本文之目的，在於闡發《莊子》哲學的知識論面向。本文主要處理《莊子》對知識的反省，探討知識在《莊子》哲學體系中的意義，並試圖以知識論角度切入，彰顯《莊子》哲學的特色與現代意義。 《莊子》中，知識論和修養論常常是彼此不分的。《莊子》指出，認知的歷程有「聽之以耳」、「聽之以心」、「聽之以氣」三個階段。相應地，依據認知來源的不同，知識亦有「耳之所知」、「心之所知」、「氣之所知」三種類型。大致與今日所謂的「感性知識」、「理性知識」和「直覺知識」相當。本文根據《莊子》字義與原文脈絡，一一考察這三種型態的認知模式。 本文首先釐清《莊子》中關於感官的各種層次，指出《莊子》中關於感官的論述，包含感官之具、感官之能、感官之徹、感官之所、感官之府五個層次。既而考察《莊子》中所有關於感官總名的術語，諸如「五官」、「天機」、「天門」、「七竅」、「九竅」、「六鑿」、「六骸」、「外」和「官知」等。並與先秦諸子相參，以突顯《莊子》對感觀的看法。接著，本文分別討論《莊子》中關於目、耳、口、鼻、形體五種感官的論述。指出這些感官意象，常常作為《莊子》論述「道」與其他抽象層面時的隱喻。繼而，本文討論《莊子》對於感官的反省，展現感官在《莊子》哲學體系中的意義。 然後，本文討論《莊子》對於「心之所知」的反省，分別探討《莊子》對「心知」的批判和「心知」的轉向與昇華。本文指出，《莊子》從三個面向反省「心知」的缺陷。首先，「心知」的外馳與過度便發展為「智巧」。智巧是將工具理性的能力發揮到極致，而進行精密的算計，《莊子》從生命本真的角度給予反省和批判。其次，「心知」的遮蔽與偏執便發展為「成心」。《莊子》對此「成心」所成就的判斷加以反省，批判僵化、固定以及普遍的判斷。最後，「心知」的一般運作為思慮，《莊子》認為這種以概念區分來掌握事物認知方式，破壞了萬物一體的原初完整性，因而無法得到「真知」。至於「心知」的轉向與昇華，本文從「心之止」、「心之明」、「心之淡漠」三個面向切入，討論《莊子》對心之認識功能的修養與轉化。 最後，本文討論「氣之所知」，分別從「虛」、「忘」、「通」三個面向分析「氣」在《莊子》哲學中的認知意義，指出「聽之以氣」並不是排除感官功能和理性功能，而是這些功能的專一、虛化、轉向、返本與昇華。「聽之以氣」是一種主體解構的認知模式，物我一體，沒有隔閡和扭曲，萬物得以如實地開顯自身而被認知。《莊子》認為通過這種認知模式才能得到「真知」。 《莊子》除了對上述認知過程三階段有深切反省外，也根據認知對象存有位階的不同，討論了「以物觀之」和「以道觀之」兩種認知型態。「以物觀之」是日常生活的認知方式，無可避免的帶入了是非等主觀價值判斷來區分事物，因而造就許多「畛域」，限制了人向「道」的開放。「以道觀之」則認為「未始有物」，類似於審美經驗和實踐智慧，物我沒有隔閡，沒有分析也沒有判斷，而是在共融的視域中彼此滲透。 除此之外，所謂的知識，還可從實際操作的實踐面向，分為命題知識(propositional knowledge)和能力知識(competence knowledge)兩大類。前者指的是知道一件事情的內容，後者則指知道如何做一件事情。前者著重知性理解而與實踐未必有關，後者則不必然是知性的理解而和實踐息息相關。《莊子》中許多「技近乎道」的故事，正向吾人顯示「道」無法作為命題內容來被認知，而必須在實際的操作中，才能向操作者開顯。 本文從認知過程、認知對象和實踐面向來研究《莊子》的知識論。可以說完整地從知識論、形上學和倫理學、美學層面，考察了《莊子》中所呈現的認知意義，從而釐清了認為《莊子》是「反智」、「反感官」、「反理性」、「懷疑主義」和「相對主義」的種種誤解。

The purpose of this dissertation is to elucidate the epistemological dimension of Zhuangzi’s philosophy. This dissertation examines Zhuangzi’s reflection on knowledge and investigates the role of knowledge played in Zhuangzi’s philosophical system. I shall approach this issue from the epistemological dimension, attempting to manifest the distinguishing characteristics of Zhuangzi’s philosophy and its relevance for today. In Zhuangzi, epistemology is often intertwined with the theory of self-cultivation. According to Zhuangzi there are three stages of cognition: listening with the ears, listening with the heart, and listening with Chi. Due to the differences in the sources of cognition, there correspond three types of knowledge: the knowledge acquired by the ears, the knowledge acquired by the heart and the knowledge acquired by Chi. These three types of knowledge are roughly similar to today’s “sensitive knowledge,” “rational knowledge” and “intuitive knowledge.” This dissertation examines these three types of cognition according to the semantics and the context of Zhuangzi. First of all, this dissertation clarifies the different aspects of sensibility in Zhuangzi, pointing out that there are five such aspects: its organs, faculties, penetrating faculties, horizons and prefecture. I then examine all technical terms relating to sensibility in Zhuangzi, such as “wu guan” (五官), “tian ji”(天機), “tain men”(天門),“qi qiao”(七竅), “jiu qiao”(九竅), “liu zao”(六鑿), “liu hai”(六骸), “wai”(外),and ” “guan zhi”(官知) .I will also compare Zhuangzi’s ideas with that of other thinkers in early China ,in order to show the peculiarity of Zhuangzi’s ideas. And then I discuss Zhuangzi’s descriptions of the five senses (the eyes, the ears, the mouth, the nose and the body), pointing out that these images of the senses are often used by Zhuangzi as the metaphors for Dao and the other abstract aspects of his philosophy. I will examine Zhuangzi’s reflection on sensibility, showing the role of sensibility in Zhuangzi’s philosophical system. Following that, I attempt to discuss Zhuangzi’s conceptualization of “knowledge acquired by the heart” by examining his critics of “knowledge acquired by the heart” and his ideas of how it should be cultivated and transformed. I will point out the limitation and restriction of “knowledge acquired by the heart” from Zhuangzi’s three perspectives. First of all, excessive use of “knowledge acquired by the heart” may develop into “intellection”. “Intellection” is the calculation of the instrumental reason developed to the utmost; Zhuangzi reflects and criticizes “intellection” from the perspective of the authentic life. Secondly, biases in “knowledge acquired by the heart” could become judgment, which has its limitations as well. Zhuangzi reflects on the judgment based on “cheng xin”(成心) and criticizes rigidified, stabilized and universal judgment. Lastly, according to Zhuangzi, using “knowledge acquired by the heart” to distinguish and understand the world will inhibit us from grasping the wholeness of the world and prevent us from the truth. To explain the cultivation and transformation of the heart’s cognitive faculty, I will illustrate the concept from three aspects, which are “zhi”(止), “ ming ”(明) and “danmo”(淡漠). Additionally, the dissertation discusses “knowledge by Chi” through “xu”(虛),“wang”(忘) and “tong”(通) to analyze the cognitive function of Chi in Zhuangzi. Then I will emphasized on the idea that “listening with Chi” does not mean the exclusion of either the faculty of sensibility or the faculty of rationality; rather, it is the concentration, deconstruction, redirection, returning and sublimation of these faculties. “listening with Chi” is a kind of cognitive style developed from the idea that “we and the world are one unit”. Therefore, when we fully attained to ourselves, we gain access to the world without limitations and distortions. Based on Zhuangzi’s theory, we can only learn the truth through this kind of cognitive style. Apart from Zhuangzi’s deep reflection on the three stages of cognition mentioned above, basing on the differences in the ontological status of the objects of cognition, he also discusses two types of cognition: “perceiving from things” and “perceiving from Dao.” “Perceiving from things” is the cognition of the ordinary life, in which we inevitably make subjective judgment to distinguish objects, thereby resulting in many “limitations,” restricting our receptivity to Dao. “Perceiving from Dao,” on the other hand, is perceiving that “there is nothing from the beginning.” And this kind of perception is similar to the aesthetic experience and wisdom of practice, in which there is no distinction between the object and the subject, no analysis and no judgment; all these interpenetrate one another in a mutually incorporating horizon. Apart from this, considering from the aspect of praxis, the so-called “knowledge” can be distinguished into the propositional knowledge and the competence knowledge. The former refers to “knowing” in the sense of knowing the content of something; the latter refers to “knowing” in the sense of knowing how to do something. The former has to do with intellectual understanding, and may not be relevant to practice; the latter, on the other hand, is not necessarily intellectual understanding but has everything to do with practice. In Zhuangzi there are many stories about “practice is near Dao,” showing that “Dao” cannot be known as the propositional knowledge, but that it is through practice that Dao is manifested to us. This dissertation investigates the epistemology of Zhuangzi from the process of cognition, the objects of cognition and the practical aspect. It can be said that the dissertation fully investigates the meaning of knowledge in Zhuangzi from the aspects of epistemology, metaphysics and aesthetics, thereby clarifying that Zhuangzi does not—as some falsely believe—profess “anti-intellectualism,” “anti-sensibilitism,” “anti-rationalism,” “skepticism,” and “relativism.”