管制當局對中國大陸公司增發配股與定向增發所檢視變數

Abstract

本文自審核結果推論中國大陸證監會處理再融資案時，所採用關鍵變數，並檢視申請再融資企業之盈餘管理行為，1997年到2010年間，上海證券交易所A股及深圳證券交易所A股申請增發及配股的上市公司中，申請前盈餘管理程度越高者易通過審核，樣本中，一線城市及未受政府保護產業盈餘管理程度較高，也較易通過審核；通過定向增發申請且發行對象為關聯方企業，則會進行向下盈餘管理，以較低價格向關聯方融資。透過申請增發配股者和未申請增發配股公司比較，企業存在自我選擇效果，會提出申請者，淨資產收益率較高且盈餘管理幅度大。惟加入時間趨勢之斜率變數後，發現企業近年相對於未通過企業，反而是在做向下盈餘操控。

This article infers the variables that may be adopted by Chinese SEC in the process of reviewing the SEO applications of firms and investigates the potential earnings management conducts of SEOs companies. Between 1997 and 2010, the companies successfully going through the processes of SEOs via Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange A shares tend to have more pronounced earnings management. Firms in the first-tier cities and the unprotected industries have higher degree of earnings management and also appear to be easier than the other firms to be approved. The companies that issue new shares to the related parties through private placements appeared to do manipulate their earning downward, thus they are alleged to lower the issue price. Finally, our tests comparing non-applicants and the granted SEOs companies show that latter group is with greater ROEs. Moreover, the applying companies tend to have abnormal discretionary accruals. In recent years, the result also shows that the granted companies manage their earnings downward.