公司治理改革下提升投資人保護的影響-來自現金股利的證據

Abstract

過去研究指出現金股利可以限制控制股東剝奪小股東的行為。在實務上，許多地雷企業，像是博達和隸屬力霸集團的公司，在爆發前很長一段時間，幾乎皆採零現金股利的發放。此外，由於台灣政府在西元兩千年推動平衡股利政策。所以在台灣公司治理改革的情境下，本論文檢視平衡股利政策所帶來的影響以及調查各項公司治理監督機制的效果。 實證結果支持平衡股利政策對於公司現金股利發放的正面影響。實證分析也發現次大股東的存在配合平衡股利政策的推動可以提昇公司現金股利的發放。另外，當公司獨立董事比率增加，現金股利也會隨之增加。上面的實證結果對於政策制定者而言，意味著相對大的次大股東之存在會使公司現金股利增加，但這情形僅發生在推動平衡股利政策之後。換言之，從現金股利發放的觀點來看，次大股東對於現金股利的監督效果必須仰賴外在的股利發放指引，例如：平衡股利政策，方能產生作用。另外，較嚴格定義的獨立董事以及外顯的股利發放指引，則共同形成了獨立董事內隱的對於公司現金股利發放之監督責任。

Prior studies indicate cash dividends play a basic role in limiting controlling shareholders’ expropriation. In practice, several business scandals in Taiwan, such as Procomp Inc. and several firms belonging to Rebar Group have distributed zero cash dividends over a long period of time. Also, the Taiwan government had promoted “Balance Dividend Policy” since 2000. Thus, the dissertation examines the impact of “Balance Dividend Policy” and investigates the effect of individual monitoring mechanisms of corporate governance on cash dividends under governance reform context in Taiwan. Empirical results suggest the positive impact of the “Balance Dividend Policy”. Findings also show that the presence of the second-largest shareholder along with the promotion of “Balance Dividend Policy” upgrade firms’ cash dividend levels. Further, cash dividends increase while the ratio of independent director increases. Meanwhile, the above findings offer insights to regulators that the presence of relatively large second largest shareholders only make firms’ cash dividends increase after the promotion of “Balance Dividend Policy”. In other words, second largest shareholders need the dividend guidelines, such as “Balance Dividend Policy” to induce their monitoring effect on cash dividend. Furthermore, this study also suggests that the stricter definition of independent directors together with the explicit dividend guidelines constitutes the implicit monitoring duties of independent directors.