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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 柯承恩 | |
dc.contributor.author | Te-Kuan Lee | en |
dc.contributor.author | 李德冠 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T23:00:10Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-08-10 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2012-08-10 | |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2012-08-07 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Abbott, L. J. and S. Parker, 2000, Auditor selection and audit committee characteristics, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 19, p47-66.
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/64822 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 過去研究指出現金股利可以限制控制股東剝奪小股東的行為。在實務上,許多地雷企業,像是博達和隸屬力霸集團的公司,在爆發前很長一段時間,幾乎皆採零現金股利的發放。此外,由於台灣政府在西元兩千年推動平衡股利政策。所以在台灣公司治理改革的情境下,本論文檢視平衡股利政策所帶來的影響以及調查各項公司治理監督機制的效果。
實證結果支持平衡股利政策對於公司現金股利發放的正面影響。實證分析也發現次大股東的存在配合平衡股利政策的推動可以提昇公司現金股利的發放。另外,當公司獨立董事比率增加,現金股利也會隨之增加。上面的實證結果對於政策制定者而言,意味著相對大的次大股東之存在會使公司現金股利增加,但這情形僅發生在推動平衡股利政策之後。換言之,從現金股利發放的觀點來看,次大股東對於現金股利的監督效果必須仰賴外在的股利發放指引,例如:平衡股利政策,方能產生作用。另外,較嚴格定義的獨立董事以及外顯的股利發放指引,則共同形成了獨立董事內隱的對於公司現金股利發放之監督責任。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Prior studies indicate cash dividends play a basic role in limiting controlling shareholders’ expropriation. In practice, several business scandals in Taiwan, such as Procomp Inc. and several firms belonging to Rebar Group have distributed zero cash dividends over a long period of time. Also, the Taiwan government had promoted “Balance Dividend Policy” since 2000. Thus, the dissertation examines the impact of “Balance Dividend Policy” and investigates the effect of individual monitoring mechanisms of corporate governance on cash dividends under governance reform context in Taiwan.
Empirical results suggest the positive impact of the “Balance Dividend Policy”. Findings also show that the presence of the second-largest shareholder along with the promotion of “Balance Dividend Policy” upgrade firms’ cash dividend levels. Further, cash dividends increase while the ratio of independent director increases. Meanwhile, the above findings offer insights to regulators that the presence of relatively large second largest shareholders only make firms’ cash dividends increase after the promotion of “Balance Dividend Policy”. In other words, second largest shareholders need the dividend guidelines, such as “Balance Dividend Policy” to induce their monitoring effect on cash dividend. Furthermore, this study also suggests that the stricter definition of independent directors together with the explicit dividend guidelines constitutes the implicit monitoring duties of independent directors. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T23:00:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-101-D93722004-1.pdf: 476145 bytes, checksum: a3e0cbc599109e0606e2c83942b35b38 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員審定書 i
誌謝 ii 中文摘要 iii 英文摘要 iv 1.Introduction 1 2.Literature Review, Evaluation and Hypotheses Development 7 2.1 Literature review 8 2.1.1 The impact of independent director or outside director on firm’s decisions 8 2.1.2 Literature on cash dividends 8 2.1.3 The impact of corporate governance on cash dividends around the world 11 2.2 Hypotheses Development 13 3.Research Design 19 3.1 Measures for Cash Dividends and Corporate Governance Monitoring Mechanisms 19 3.2 Empirical Models 27 4.Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 30 4.1 Sample Selection 30 4.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics 31 5.Empirical results 38 5.1Effect of the “Balance Dividend Policy” on Cash Dividends 38 5.2 Effect of the Monitoring Mechanism of the Board on Cash Dividends 38 5.3 Effect of Control Variables on Cash Dividends 40 5.4 Robustness Check and Extra Tests 44 5.4.1 The amendment of Company Act on Relatively small shareholders 44 5.4.2Firm’s growth 47 5.4.3Free cash flow 52 5.4.4 The effect of mandatory independent directors 57 5.4.5 What does the second largest shareholder monitoring mechanism work? 58 6.Concluding Remarks and Implications 61 7.Reference 65 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.title | 公司治理改革下提升投資人保護的影響-來自現金股利的證據 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The Effect of Enhancing Investor Protection under Corporate Governance Reform: Evidence from Cash Dividend Perspective | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 100-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 沈中華,李淑華,廖珮真,廖芝嫻 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 公司治理,股利政策,獨立董事,次大股東,平衡股利政策, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Corporate Governance,Dividend Policy,Independent Director,Second largest shareholder,Balance Dividend Policy, | en |
dc.relation.page | 70 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2012-08-07 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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