洛克的知覺理論

Abstract

在本文中，我說明了洛克在《人類理解論》當中的觀念理論，基本上是建構於知覺的表徵理論之上。我主張洛克接受觀念表徵論，但他並非是關於外在世界的懷疑論者。在洛克之前許多哲學家包括亞里斯多德、多瑪斯和笛卡兒等人的對於知覺問題，也是在處理人類思想如何表徵外在世界。一直以來，洛克由於「觀念」是直接被知覺的對象，而被詮釋為表徵實在論者。不過，還是存在有以「直接實在論」以及「副詞化論」來詮釋洛克的「觀念」理論。我將指出直接實在論和副詞化論都不具說服力。我傾向主張：如觀念表徵論所言，觀念存在，而且洛克也承認外在世界的存在，我們所要做的則是修正表徵實在論。 再者，我說明了洛克知覺理論中，簡單觀念在心智與外在世界之間所扮演的角色。在知覺過程中，心靈獲得性質觀念，而性質觀念是物質對象最初始而且主動的特徵。我將指出初性與次性的區分是受質疑的，初性與次性的區分並非觀念的表徵實在論所預設。而且，宣稱「力」是一種次階認知，而指稱洛克是直接實在論者，這種立場並非正確。 最後，我提供一種間接的方式，從洛克的語言立場來思考知覺的「帷幕」或「斷裂」的問題。基於之前章節支持表徵實在論的討論之上，我企圖以洛克的語言立場來間接消解「帷幕」問題。方式主要是指出觀念與世界密切的關係，以及觀念論並不意味著私有語言。我也會試圖解決觀念表徵論可能會面臨的困難。

In this essay, I argue that Locke's theory of ideas in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding is fundamentally based on representative theory of perception. Locke accepts the representative theory of perception but he is not a skeptic about the external world. Before Locke, many philosophers, such as Aristotle, St. Thomas and Descartes, take a theory of perception to be to deal with the problem if or whether human thoughts represent the external world. Traditionally, Locke is interpreted as holding ideas to be the only immediately perceived objects, that is, he is taken to be a representative realist. However, there are still different interpretations of Locke's 'ideas', e.g., the direct realist interpretation and the adverbialist interpretation. I show that both the direct realist and the adverbialist interpretations are implausible. I tend to say both that ideas exist, as the representative theory has it, and that Locke accepts the existence of the external world. What we have to do is revise the representative theory. Moreover, I exhibit how Locke's 'simple ideas' play the role of mediating the mind and the external world in his theory of perception. Ideas of qualities are the very primitive and active features of physical objects in perception when they cause the mind to obtain ideas of them. I also argue that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is problematic and that the distinction need not be assumed in the representative theory. Meanwhile, it is not correct to say that Locke is a direct realist when he claims that powers are second-order recognitions. Finally, I provide an indirect way to argue about the discrepancy of ideas and the world which appeals to Locke's own philosophy of language. Based on the previous discussions, I aim to dissolve the veil problem indirectly by Locke's theory of language. The approaches are to reveal ideas' close relation to the world. Thus, the theory of ideas does not entail private language.