董事會與小股東間的代理問題對公司信用風險的影響，從公司更換執行長的面向探討

Abstract

董事會與小股東之間的代理問題是之前在公司治理層面很少探討的領域，本篇文章從Taylor (2010) 的模型出發，提供一個指標可以衡量董事會與小股東之間的代理問題，進而根據2001年到2010年的實證資料，探討此代理問題與公司信用風險的關係。我們發現在控制許多重要的解釋變數下，在事件研究中，董事會與小股東之間的代理問題對其所發行之公司債利差將有顯著的正向影響。除此之外，我們也發現一些與董事會、執行長和公司特定的特徵對於董事會與小股東之間的代理問題會有顯著的影響。最後，我們將資料擴展為全樣本分析，發現董事會與小股東之間的代理問題仍然對公司債利差提供可貴的資訊。

The agency problem between the boards and Minority equity holders is rarely discussed in the field of corporate governance before. Based on Taylor’s (2010) model this study develops a measure for the agency problem between boards and Minority equity holders and empirically investigates. The relationship between this agency problem and company credit risk employing American company data from 2001 to 2010. We find that, controlling many important explanatory variables, the agency problem between the boards and Minority equity holders have a significant and positive impact on corporate bonds yield spreads in the event study. In addition, we find that some board-related, CEO-related and firm-specific features have a significant relationship with the agency problem between board and Minority equity holders. Finally, we extend the data to full sample study and, still find that the agency problem between the boards and Minority equity holders provides valuable information to the corporate credit risk.