聞道長安似弈棋：解析唐大明宮遺址的保護過程和二十一世紀西安市的復興神話

Abstract

大明宮曾是盛唐時期長安城的政令中樞，隨著唐末戰亂廢毀而沉寂千年。直到1930 年代，河南難民在此展開新生活，卻受限於遺址保護而無從發展，使此地成為西安市民眼中窳陋的、罪惡的「道北地區」。然而，這一切都在2007年10 月曲江管委會操盤此區的城市運營後大幅改觀：在短短三年之間，10 萬名城中村農民和棚戶區居民遷離遺址，遺址則「華麗蛻變」為大明宮國家考古遺址公園。本文由此事件切入西安市當前的歷史計劃與城市復興計劃，從遺址保護神話的再現、執行保護改造之新型地方政府團隊的組織與權力關係、地方政府藉遺址保護進行城市運營的實質過程等角度進行分析，反思歷史與地方的相互形塑interplay，以及遺址保護、再利用與城市經濟、土地開發之間的緊密關聯。 本文首先透視不同空間代理人對遺址保護本質及歷史空間意義賦予的衝突過程。研究發現曲江管委會藉由構築其心目中的「唐代盛世」，一舉殲滅遺址上的城中村與棚戶區、抹除地方記憶。自詡科學、追求真實性、標榜普世價值的保護思維已轉向視遺址為「劇場」、著重敘事與表演的歷史空間活化實踐，結合地方經濟發展和社會再生的正當性訴求。本文接著耙梳促成遺址歷史時空再現的地方權力集團網絡關係，發現大明宮國家考古遺址公園乃是政府特權與企業、金融資本共同運作的結果。涉入遺址區建設的政府機構、企業、開發商、銀行實際上皆為國家力量的延伸；如此特殊的組織與運作模式提供了對西方理論的修正。最後，本文詳述在分稅制下，地方政府以遺址保護作為「廢都」復興手段的城市運營過程。藉由對保護規劃理想與實踐的比較、以及對財務資料的分析，本文指出借力土地財政的侷限及其對資源重分配造成的影響。本文總結政、企、銀結盟的體制迴避了監督與制衡、反噬遺址保護的初衷，值得西安市、乃至全中國大陸其它即將循類似模式進行保護、開發的遺址區借鑒。

Daming Palace, one of grand Tang’s political cores, was abandoned for more than a thousand years. It is not until the 1930s did thousands of refugees swarm into the site of relic and build stigmatized slum area on their own. During the years from 2007 to 2010, the former palace has been transformed into a gigantic Tang-themed urban heritage park from sites of slums, urban villages, factories, and dumping grounds. This historic event is part of the renaissance project of contemporary Xi’an. From studying the remodeling process of Daming Palace heritage site, this article reconsiders the interplay of history and the place and the close relationship among conservation, revitalization, local economics, and urban land development. First, this article scrutinizes the contest for representing Daming Palace heritage site among various official spatial agents. It is observed that the Qu-jiang Committee carefully wiped out domestic collective memory, evicted urban village and slum dwellers by their self-claimed renaissance discourse. Under the tax assignment system, Xi’an municipal government now has to take revitalization into consideration while conceiving conservation planning. These renaissance projects not only aim for conservation but also for economic development and social benefit. For achieving this goal, more emphasis is put on how to design and represent the heritage site as a “theatre” that tells stories. Second, this article analyzes the relational network of the local power bloc that promoted and executed this renaissance project. It proposes that the swift realization of the national heritage park should attribute to the synergy of various-level local governments, enterprises, developers, and banks. All of such institutes benefit from their accessibility to state power and state capital. This unique organizational mechanism can serve as a supplement and revise to western theories. Last, this article elaborates on the physical process of how the Qu-jiang Committee constructed, operated, and managed this urban heritage park. By comparing the conservation ideal and practice, and analyzing related financial reports, it points out the limit and consequences of land finance. This article concludes that the interest alliance of governments, enterprises, and banks as a whole bypasses the scrutiny and supervision from the central state, which in turn jeopardizes conservation.