企業管理品質、股東價值與董事會與少數股東間的代理問題

Abstract

董事會與小股東之間的代理問題為股東關心的重要課題，卻鮮少為人探討。本文引用Taylor(2010)與Chen et al.(2012)衡量此代理問題的方法，分析董事會與小股東之間的代理問題與企業管理品質的關係，及進一步探討此代理問題對股東價值的影響。本研究以過去二十年曾更換執行長的美國企業為樣本，資料期間從2000年至2009年。實證結果顯示當代理問題越小，企業的管理階層傾向擁有越多管理經驗、平均年資越短且在外的聲譽越高。此外，此代理問題亦與股東價值呈現反向關係，意味著消彌此代理問題將有助於股東價值的提升。

The agency problem between boards and minority shareholders is crucial for shareholders (later denoted as B-E agency problem). However, it is seldom discussed in the existing studies. This study explores the relationship between the B-E agency problem and management quality and examines the effect of the B-E agency problem on shareholder value by employing American firms, with the occurrence of CEO turnover in the past twenty years, from 2000 to 2009. The empirical results reveal that the smaller the B-E agency problem, the more experienced the more prestigious and the shorter-tenured managers are. Moreover, the B-E agency problem shows significant and negative relationship with shareholder value, indicating that mitigating the conflict between the boards and minority shareholders is conducive to shareholder value.