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http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/61886完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 廖咸興(Hsien-Hsing Liao) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Chia-Fang Lee | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 李珈芳 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T13:17:15Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-07-31 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2013-07-31 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2013-07-29 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Baer, Markus, and Oldham, Greg R., 2006. “The curvilinear relation between experienced creative time pressure and creativity：Moderating effects of openness to experience and support for creativity”, Journal of Applied Psychology 91, 963~970.
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., Ferrell A., ,2009, “What matters in corporate governance?”, The Review of Financial Studies 22, 783-827. Chemmanur, T.J., Paeglis, I., Simonyan, K., 2009. “Management quality, financial and investment policies, and asymmetric information”, Journal of Financial and Qualitative Analysis 44, 1045~1079. Chemmanur, T.J., Fulghieri, P., 1994. “Investment bank reputation, information production, and financial intermediation”, Journal of Finance 49, 57~79. Chemmanur, T.J., Paeglis, I., 2005. “Management quality, certification, and initial public offerings”, Journal of Financial Economics 76, 331~368. Collins and Moore, 1970. New York：Appleton-Century-Crofts Dalton, Dan R., Kesner, Idalene F., 1985. “Organizational performance as an antecedent of inside/outside chief executive succession：An empirical assessment”, Academy of Management Journal 28, 749-762. Dane, E., 2010. “Reconsidering the trade-off between expertise and flexibility：A cognitive entrenchment perspective”, Academy of Management Review 35, 579~603. Eisenhardt, K.M., Schoonhoven, C.B., 1990. “Organization growth：Linking founding team, strategy, environment, and growth among U.S. semiconductor ventures, 1978-1988”, Administrative Science Quarterly 35, 504~529. Geiger, M.A., North, D.S., O'Connell, B.T., 2005. “The auditor-to-client revolving door and earnings management”, Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 20, 1-26. Haleblian, J., Finikelstein, S., 1993. “Top management team size, CEO dominance, and firm performance：The moderating roles of environmental turbulence and discretion”, Academy of Management Journal 36, 844~863. Johnson R.A., Hoskisson R.E., Hitt M.A., 1993. “Board of director involvement in restructuring：The effects of board versus managerial controls and characteristics”, Strategic Management Journal 14, 33-50. Lennox C., 2005. “Audit quality and executive officers’ affiliations with CPA firms”, Journal of Accounting Economics 39, 201~231. Michael, J.G., Hambrick, D.C., 1992. “Diversification posture and top management team characteristics”, Academy of Management Journal 35, 9~37. Petersen, M.A., 2009. “Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing approaches”, Review of Financial Studies 22, 435-480. Shaw, M.E., Harkey, B., 1976. “Some effects of congruency of member characteristics and group structure upon group behavior”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 34, 412-418. Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1989. “Management entrenchment ：The case of manager-specific investments”, Journal of Financial Economics 25, 123-139. Tsung-Kang Chen, T.K., Liao, H.H., Chen, W.C., Chen2012. “The agency problem effect between boards and minority equity holders on credit risk: CEO firing threshold perspective”, Working Paper. Taylor, Lucian A., 2010. “Why are CEO rarely fired? Evidence from structural estimation”, Journal of Finance 65, 2051-2087. Wiersema, M.F., Bantel, K.A., 1992. “Top management team demography and corporate strategic change', Academy of Management Journal 35, 91-121. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/61886 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 董事會與小股東之間的代理問題為股東關心的重要課題，卻鮮少為人探討。本文引用Taylor(2010)與Chen et al.(2012)衡量此代理問題的方法，分析董事會與小股東之間的代理問題與企業管理品質的關係，及進一步探討此代理問題對股東價值的影響。本研究以過去二十年曾更換執行長的美國企業為樣本，資料期間從2000年至2009年。實證結果顯示當代理問題越小，企業的管理階層傾向擁有越多管理經驗、平均年資越短且在外的聲譽越高。此外，此代理問題亦與股東價值呈現反向關係，意味著消彌此代理問題將有助於股東價值的提升。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | The agency problem between boards and minority shareholders is crucial for shareholders (later denoted as B-E agency problem). However, it is seldom discussed in the existing studies. This study explores the relationship between the B-E agency problem and management quality and examines the effect of the B-E agency problem on shareholder value by employing American firms, with the occurrence of CEO turnover in the past twenty years, from 2000 to 2009. The empirical results reveal that the smaller the B-E agency problem, the more experienced the more prestigious and the shorter-tenured managers are. Moreover, the B-E agency problem shows significant and negative relationship with shareholder value, indicating that mitigating the conflict between the boards and minority shareholders is conducive to shareholder value. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T13:17:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-102-R00723053-1.pdf: 225332 bytes, checksum: 6ac8d6bc56e828ed5663e61c5d545b3e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員審定書 i
致謝 ii 摘要 iii Abstract iv Contents v Tables vi I. Introduction 1 II. Hypotheses 7 III. Data and Sample Selection 9 1. Proxy for management quality 9 2. Proxy for the B-E agency problem 12 3. Proxies for shareholder value 13 4. Proxies for other aspects of firm quality 14 IV. Empirical Analyses 15 1. Panel regression analysis：single variable 15 2. Panel regression analyses：single variable controlling firm quality variables 17 V. Conclusions 19 References 20 Table 1. Management Quality Variables in Three Categories 23 Table 2. Hypotheses Summary 24 Table 3. Summary Statistics of Major Variables 25 Table 4. The effect of the B-E Agency Problem on Management Quality 26 Table 5. The effect of the B-E Agency Problem on Shareholder Value 29 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.title | 企業管理品質、股東價值與董事會與少數股東間的代理問題 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Management Quality, Shareholder Value and the Agency Problem between Boards and Minority Shareholders | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 101-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳聖賢,胡星陽,陳宗岡 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 管理品質,代理問題,股東價值, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | management quality,B-E agency problem,shareholder value, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 29 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2013-07-29 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 財務金融學系 | |
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