不完全訊息下模組化程度對逆向供應鏈之契約金與獎勵金決策影響

Abstract

近年來在環保法令的規範下，製造商必須負責電子產品的生產至棄置流程，因此，為確保回收的工作更有效率，許多企業會委託第三方物流業者(Third-party Logistics)來分擔部分或全部廢棄電子產品的回收處理工作。本研究採用Stackelberg模型為基礎，建構廢棄電子產品的分權式逆向供應鏈回收系統，在此模型中，製造商為領導者(Leader)，第三方物流業者為跟隨者(Follower)。隨後以集權式逆向供應鏈回收系統做為基準，指出分權式系統確實存在雙重邊際效應(Double marginalization)。系統中考量模組化(Modularity)程度的不確定性，利用平均變異數分析法(Mean-Variance Analysis)將此不完全資訊納入決策考量，以效用極大為目標探討製造商如何訂定最適的契約金額來給予第三方物流業者，以及第三方物流業者在契約金的影響下，如何訂定給予顧客的最適獎勵金。最後，本研究以敏感度分析討論均衡決策(Equilibrium Decision)之經濟意涵。

Due to eco-awareness and legislative requirements in recent years, manufacturers have to take the responsibility of recycling their own brand-name products. Many enterprises cooperate with third-party logistics service providers to bear responsibilities for part (or all) of recycling operations of waste electrical and electronic products. We propose a decentralized recycling system based on the Stackelberg model for waste electrical and electronic products in a reverse supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, as a leader, and a third-party logistics service provider, as a follower. Then a centralized recycling system regarded as the benchmark, pointed out that the double marginalization problem exists in decentralized recycling system. With consideration of modularity uncertainty, we study the equilibrium decision on contract rent for the third-party logistics service provider and the optimal reward money for customers by applying a mean-variance analysis formulation. Finally, an extensive sensitivity analysis is conducted to explore how the modularity uncertainty affects the optimal decisions and profits.