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  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
  2. 管理學院
  3. 國際企業學系
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/60727
Title: 機構投資人持股穩定性與企業績效分析
The Analysis of the Relationship between Stability of Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance
Authors: Yu-Hsuan Lin
林郁軒
Advisor: 盧秋玲(Chiuling Lu)
Keyword: 機構投資人,持股穩定性,監督效果,公司績效,
Institutional investors,Monitor effect,Firm performance,
Publication Year : 2020
Degree: 碩士
Abstract: 過去公司治理相關研究在探討機構投資人對其之影響時,多以持股比例作為衡量變數,然而持股比例的大小並不能完全反應機構投資人的監督效果,因此本研究改以機構投資人持股穩定性來進行衡量,以台灣上市櫃公司作為研究對象,探討機構投資人持股穩定性與企業績效關聯性,是否機構投資人會發揮其監督功能,使公司價值及績效提升。而本研究實證結果顯示,在台灣資本市場下以全體機構投資人監督效果確實存在,其持股穩定性與企業績效呈顯著正相關聯。
除此之外,本研究進一步探討機構投資人之異質性,將機構投資人區分為主動監控與被動監控型機構投資人,其實證結果發現,在主動監控型機構投資人組合下,其持股穩定性與企業績效間關聯性更強,其產生之監督效果更為明顯,其原因可能為該組合之機構投資人因無與其公司存在潛在業務關係,故具較高誘因監督公司管理層,進而降低代理成本提高企業績效。

The purpose of the study is to assess the association between stability of institutional ownership and corporate firm performance within a simultaneous equation model. The results are consistent with the view with the view that stable institutional investors play an effective role in monitoring. We find that there is a positive relationship between institutional ownership stability and firm performance.
In addition, we also investigate the heteroscedasticity of the institutional investors. When we divide institutional investors into two groups: active monitor and passive monitor categories, we find that stable shareholding of each group has a larger positive impact on performance in pressure-insensitive group and the reason is that the active-monitoring institutional investors that are free of conflicts of interests would have greater incentives and abilities to monitor the management.
URI: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/60727
DOI: 10.6342/NTU202001283
Fulltext Rights: 有償授權
Appears in Collections:國際企業學系

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