以⽣機物質主義之視角重審《蒼蠅王》中的腐化⼈性

Abstract

威廉．⾼汀的《蒼蠅王》將⼈性詮釋為⼀種本質穩固、獨立且全能自主的健全主體，並以⼈性原罪做為其唯⼀墮落的開端。不過，⾼汀這⽅對⼈性的根本構思遑論隱約觸及了⼈本決定論。如取徑於班尼特的⽣機物質主義，我們不難發現，⼈之主體性應為⼀種無疆界之非自治場域，攙雜著⼈與非⼈即興演出的雜音混曲多重奏。換⾔之，為了鬆動⾼汀的論述脈絡，本論⽂在訴諸於班尼特的理論後指出《蒼蠅王》所建構之⼈類主體性巧妙地忽略那些無法收攏納⼊⼈類意義與規則的物質能動性。除了擺脫傳統桎梏——即⼈之特殊性永遠優於非⼈，班尼特將該物質能動性定義為⼀種極易變、不穩定且超越⼈本主義所能涵蓋的能動量，甚⾔之，該物質能動性恍若隨時能與⼈共構成組配系統。針對⼈與非⼈之本體關係的重新思考，我們將對《蒼蠅王》所展現之腐化⼈性有迥然不同於傳統認知的開創性理解。不過，眾多評論家也點出，班尼特這般對非⼈相關概念的討論是否也帶來替⼈類卸責之疑義？針對那些彷彿盡失原意的誤解，本論⽂嘗試佐證，班尼特所論及的組配論其實並未替⼈類卸責：⼈類也是共同參與者，其能動性或意向性也在不同程度上左右整個組配系統的運作軌跡，⽽該組配論甚⾄犀利道出，我們對非⼈之能動性的策略性顛覆理解能強化作為⼈理論上該承擔的責任。

In William Golding’s Lord of the Flies, human nature is understood as a stable endin-itself or an autonomous entirety, inevitably haunted by humans’ original sin. This presentation that alludes to a deterministic form of human subjectivity seems amenable to reanalysis. As this thesis maintains, we should reimagine, via the resort to Jane Bennett’s theory, that humanity should be an open, non-self-governing space, as a form of ontological configuration that involves a mutuality of human and nonhuman agency. Namely, the images of humanity that disregard the acknowledgement of the forces outside the sovereignty of humans are redefined. Then Bennett’s materialist comprehension, beside its insistence upon a radical revision of the hierarchical order between humans and nonhumans, espouses a form of efficacy in excess of human designs or meanings. This efficacy, which is highly volatile or recalcitrant and has a resistance to stability or to being exclusively localized to humans, is self-compelled by its own distributive tendency to spread across any available assemblages. The expression of this vital force, regarding the force’s persistent creativity and its inherent diversity, offers a host of new ways to explore the ontological possibilities of agencies and may, as argued by this thesis, also help reenvision the causes of human depravity in Lord of the Flies as not solely a consequence of the human-directed acts. Concerning the fact that such a discernment lends no help to echo to the existing human-centered theories, about humans’ will, distinctiveness, or intentionality, many critics inquire if Bennett’s concentration on material vitality exempts humans from responsibility. Yet, a return to Bennett’s theory should dissolve such a concern as we learn that humans are held as a critical co-participant, whose agency and thus responsibility are nonetheless entailed in the assemblages. Other than omitting humans’ responsibility, our acknowledgement of the nonhuman efficacies can even enhance the responsibility of human individuals.