薪資報酬差距對公司績效的影響

Abstract

本研究主要探討高階經理人與員工之薪資報酬差距 (Pay ratio) 與公司績效之關係。本研究以資產報酬率 (ROA) 作為公司績效之應變數，樣本所涵蓋之所有期間則為2007年至2014年之美國上市櫃公司。 在公司特質與其是否揭露足夠資訊以設算Pay ratio的模型中，實證結果顯示，當公司的CEO有過高的薪資報酬、當公司跨國營運的程度愈高及當公司屬於勞力密集型產業時，其揭露足夠資訊以設算Pay ratio的意願就愈低；而當公司規模愈大及當公司由四大會計師事務所查核時，其會較願意揭露可供設算Pay ratio的資訊。本研究認為，公司在決定是否揭露完整的薪資報酬資訊時，主要會考量在揭露此資訊後，可能會對公司造成那些有利或不利的影響，無論其選擇揭露與否，公司會盡可能做出對其有利的決策。 在公司短期績效與Pay ratio 模型中，本研究分析公司前一年度之Pay ratio與當年度之ROA的關係，實證結果顯示，當公司給予其CEO的報酬愈高時 (可能造成Pay ratio 愈大)，公司的經營績效就會愈好，本研究認為，此結果符合本研究所推測之競賽理論的立場：當公司支付較高的薪酬給競爭獲勝的經理人時 (可能造成Pay ratio 愈大)，愈能夠促使經理人在高薪酬的誘惑下做出最大的努力，激勵經理人投入其工作而有助於提高公司整體的營運績效。

This paper examines the relationship between firm performance and Pay ratio. Furthermore, the paper also examines the relationship between the performance of the company and its pay gap. In this paper, firm performance is proxied by the rate of return on assets (ROA) and all samples are US-listed companies, covering the period from 2007 to 2014. Empirical results show that when the company's CEO is overpaid, has higher degree of the company’s overseas operations and belongs to the labor-intensive industries, the company is less likely to disclose information necessary to infer its pay gap. By contrast, when the company is larger and audited by Big four accounting firms, it is more likely to disclose the information necessary to reveal the pay gap. This finding suggests that, the costs and benefits of revealing such information affect the firm’s decision whether to disclose it. In addition, I find that when the deviation between the CEO and other employees’ compensation is larger, the company exhibits better operating performance. This finding is consistent with the Tournament theory: when companies pay higher salaries to the managers winning the competition (which may cause pay ratio to be greater), the managers will be encouraged and thus make greater efforts to improve firm’s operating performance.