執行長最適內部負債薪酬與公司現金持有調整

Abstract

本論文使用2006年至2016年之美國公司資料，分析執行長內部負債比率與最適值之差距對於現金持有水準、調整速率及現金持有價值之影響，以驗證執行長在內部負債比率愈接近最適值時，其現金持有決策是否更能平衡股東與債權人利益。 實證結果發現，執行長內部負債比率與最適值相距愈近，則公司之現金持有水準愈低，但公司現金持有水準並未因此愈接近目標比率。在現金持有調整速率方面，執行長內部負債比率與最適值相距愈近，則公司現金持有調整速率愈快，與最適契約觀點相符。然而，若以現金持有是否充裕區分樣本，則可發現此現象僅存在於現金持有充裕之子樣本；對於現金持有相對缺乏之公司，內部負債比率愈高之執行長將更加積極提升現金比率，符合風險趨避假說。 而在現金持有價值方面，本研究則發現執行長最適內部負債比率是否接近最適值與公司現金持有價值並無顯著關聯。

Using the data of U.S. firms between 2006 and 2016, this thesis examines the effect of the CEO inside debt ratio (i.e., the relative debt-to-equity incentive ratio) on a firm’s cash balance, cash holding adjustment speed, and value of cash. It shows that firms tend to hold less cash when their CEO inside debt ratios are closer to the predicted optima, but there is no evidence that the firms’ cash ratios would get closer to the targets at the same time. It also finds that firms accelerate cash adjustments when their CEO inside debt ratios are closer to the predicted optima. On the other hand, for firms with lower cash holdings, a higher CEO inside debt ratio will lead to a higher cash adjustment speed. In addition, the difference between a firm’s CEO inside debt ratio and its predicted optimal level does not have a significant impact on the value of cash.