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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 陳業寧(Yehning Chen) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yong-Ruey Ay | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 艾永芮 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T08:21:51Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2020-07-22 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2020-07-22 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2020-07-12 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 1. Bates, T. W., Kahle, K. M., Stulz, R. M. (2009). Why do U.S. firms hold so much more cash than they used to? The Journal of Finance, 64(5), 1985-2021. 2. Black, F., Scholes, M. (1973). The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. Journal of Political Economy, 81(3), 637-654. 3. Borah, N., James, H. L., Park, J. C. (2020). Does CEO inside debt compensation benefit both shareholders and debtholders? Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 1-45. 4. Campbell, T. C., Galpin, N., Johnson, S. A. (2016). Optimal inside debt compensation and the value of equity and debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 119(2), 336-352. 5. Cassell, C. A., Huang, S. X., Manuel Sanchez, J., Stuart, M. D. (2012). Seeking safety: The relation between CEO inside debt holdings and the riskiness of firm investment and financial policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 103(3), 588-610. 6. Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., Naveen, L. (2006). Managerial incentives and risk-taking. Journal of Financial Economics, 79(2), 431-468. 7. Core, J., Guay, W. (2002). Estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios and their sensitivities to price and volatility. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(3), 613-630. 8. Daniel, N., Li, Y., Naveen, L. (2013). No asymmetry in pay for luck. Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California. 9. Dittmar, A. K., Duchin, R. (2010). The dynamics of cash. Ross School of Business Paper, (1138). 10. Edmans, A., Liu, Q. (2010). Inside debt. Review of Finance, 15(1), 75-102. 11. Eisdorfer, A., Giaccotto, C., White, R. (2013). Capital structure, executive compensation, and investment efficiency. Journal of Banking Finance, 37(2), 549-562. 12. Faulkender, M., Wang, R. (2006). Corporate financial policy and the value of cash. The Journal of Finance, 61(4), 1957-1990. 13. Freund, S., Latif, S., Phan, H. V. (2018). Executive compensation and corporate financing policies: Evidence from CEO inside debt. Journal of Corporate Finance, 50, 484-504. 14. Jensen, M. C., Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. 15. Jiang, Z., Lie, E. (2016). Cash holding adjustments and managerial entrenchment. Journal of Corporate Finance, 36, 190-205. 16. Kabir, R., Li, H., Veld-Merkoulova, Y. V. (2013). Executive compensation and the cost of debt. Journal of Banking Finance, 37(8), 2893-2907. 17. Liu, Y., Mauer, D. C. (2011). Corporate cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives. Journal of Financial Economics, 102(1), 183-198. 18. Liu, Y., Mauer, D. C., Zhang, Y. (2014). Firm cash holdings and CEO inside debt. Journal of Banking Finance, 42, 83-100. 19. Merton, R. C. (1973). Theory of rational option pricing. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 141-183. 20. Opler, T., Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R., Williamson, R. (1999). The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial Economics, 52(1), 3-46. 21. Phan, H. V. (2014). Inside debt and mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 49(5-6), 1365-1401. 22. Smith Jr, C. W., Warner, J. B. (1979). On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants. Journal of Financial Economics, 7(2), 117-161. 23. Sundaram, R. K., Yermack, D. L. (2007). Pay me later: Inside debt and its role in managerial compensation. The Journal of Finance, 62(4), 1551-1588. 24. Wei, C., Yermack, D. (2011). Investor reactions to CEOs' inside debt incentives. The Review of Financial Studies, 24(11), 3813-3840. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/58605 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本論文使用2006年至2016年之美國公司資料，分析執行長內部負債比率與最適值之差距對於現金持有水準、調整速率及現金持有價值之影響，以驗證執行長在內部負債比率愈接近最適值時，其現金持有決策是否更能平衡股東與債權人利益。
實證結果發現，執行長內部負債比率與最適值相距愈近，則公司之現金持有水準愈低，但公司現金持有水準並未因此愈接近目標比率。在現金持有調整速率方面，執行長內部負債比率與最適值相距愈近，則公司現金持有調整速率愈快，與最適契約觀點相符。然而，若以現金持有是否充裕區分樣本，則可發現此現象僅存在於現金持有充裕之子樣本；對於現金持有相對缺乏之公司，內部負債比率愈高之執行長將更加積極提升現金比率，符合風險趨避假說。 而在現金持有價值方面，本研究則發現執行長最適內部負債比率是否接近最適值與公司現金持有價值並無顯著關聯。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Using the data of U.S. firms between 2006 and 2016, this thesis examines the effect of the CEO inside debt ratio (i.e., the relative debt-to-equity incentive ratio) on a firm’s cash balance, cash holding adjustment speed, and value of cash. It shows that firms tend to hold less cash when their CEO inside debt ratios are closer to the predicted optima, but there is no evidence that the firms’ cash ratios would get closer to the targets at the same time. It also finds that firms accelerate cash adjustments when their CEO inside debt ratios are closer to the predicted optima. On the other hand, for firms with lower cash holdings, a higher CEO inside debt ratio will lead to a higher cash adjustment speed. In addition, the difference between a firm’s CEO inside debt ratio and its predicted optimal level does not have a significant impact on the value of cash. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T08:21:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-1207202018515400.pdf: 1569766 bytes, checksum: 4af82283ea0b8039f47291e533968bdc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 摘要 i Abstract ii 目錄 iii 表目錄 v 第一章 緒論 1 第二章 文獻回顧與假說發展 5 2.1 執行長內部負債薪酬 5 2.2 公司現金持有水準、調整速率及其價值 7 2.3 執行長內部負債薪酬與公司現金持有水準及其價值 8 2.4 假說發展 9 2.4.1 執行長最適內部負債比率與公司現金持有水準 10 2.4.2 執行長最適內部負債比率與公司現金持有調整速率 12 2.4.3 執行長最適內部負債比率與公司現金持有價值 13 第三章 研究方法與研究樣本 14 3.1 變數定義與實證模型 14 3.1.1 執行長最適內部負債比率 14 3.1.2 公司現金持有水準與調整速率 16 3.1.3 公司現金持有價值 19 3.2 樣本處理與敘述統計 20 第四章 實證結果與分析 29 4.1 一階迴歸結果 29 4.1.1執行長最適內部負債比率 29 4.1.2公司目標現金比率 32 4.2 主要分析結果 34 4.2.1 執行長最適內部負債比率對公司現金持有水準之影響 34 4.2.2 執行長最適內部負債比率對公司現金持有調整速率之影響 37 4.2.3 執行長內部負債比率對公司現金持有調整速率之影響 40 4.2.4 執行長最適內部負債比率對公司現金持有價值之影響 43 第五章 結論 46 參考文獻 48 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 內部負債 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 執行長薪酬 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 現金持有價值 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 調整速率 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 現金持有 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Executive Compensation | en |
| dc.subject | Inside Debt | en |
| dc.subject | Cash Holdings | en |
| dc.subject | Adjustment Speed | en |
| dc.subject | Value of Cash | en |
| dc.title | 執行長最適內部負債薪酬與公司現金持有調整 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | CEO Optimal Inside Debt Compensation and Firm Cash Holding Adjustments | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 108-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 王衍智(Yanzhi Wang),張景宏(Ching-Hung Chang) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 執行長薪酬,內部負債,現金持有,調整速率,現金持有價值, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Executive Compensation,Inside Debt,Cash Holdings,Adjustment Speed,Value of Cash, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 50 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202001452 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2020-07-13 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 財務金融學系 | |
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