政府體制、選舉制度與選舉課責

Abstract

聚焦於選舉課責之經濟投票研究，並承襲政府體制與選舉制度的配套思考，本文認為，不僅選舉制度可能遭經濟投票相關研究輕忽，選民實踐經濟投票的能力既然是制度誘發的政治效應，且政治效應又深受政府體制與選舉制度共同形塑之政府型態影響，兩者配套思考而衍生的交互變項，應是不可不察的重要關鍵。因此，以1960年至2012年共546次民主國會選舉作為研究對象，結合複迴歸統計模型之操作，本文欲觀察，政府體制與選舉制度的制度配套、總體經濟指標之GDP人均成長率以及主要執政黨的得票率與席次率之間，是否存在符合預期的統計顯著關係。 研究發現，相較於「半總統制配上多數決制」，因為有著「政治責任明確」以及「課責機會充分」之制度條件，當兼採內閣制或是總統制之非半總統制以及多數決制時，經濟投票較具有統計顯著性；而當選舉制度為比例代表制時，縱使與課責機會維持充分的總統制搭配，經濟投票的發生情形仍不顯著。另外，若依據「有利經濟投票與否」進一步區分制度配套，並兩兩比較，無論是和「非總統制搭配比例代表制」或是「總統制搭配比例代表制」相比，由於責任明確度不一定高且課責機會並不充分，「半總統制搭配多數決制」都較不容易發生經濟投票。而在經過一連串自變數的調整之後，研究發現仍舊維持不變，如此一來，便通過了穩健度檢驗的測試，進而使得研究結論更臻完備、更具說服力。 總的而言，就主要執政黨的選舉表現看來，本文推斷，政府體制與選舉制度的配套思考確實會對經濟投票產生影響，一旦制度條件俱足，經濟投票的發生機率便會較高。

Following the route of former researchers’ efforts on the government regimes and the electoral systems, this thesis is aiming at the study of the economic voting within the electoral accountability. A voter’s motive to practice economic voting, as one of the political effects induced by institutions, is closely related to the form of government shaped by both the government regimes and the electoral systems. The intersectional consideration between the government regimes and the electoral systems, the latter not as seemingly irrelevant as in the studies of economic voting, is proved indispensable to the studies of economic voting. Thus, the statistical significance, based on 546 parliamentary elections in the democratic countries worldwide from 1960 to 2012, among the institutional intersection of the government regimes and the electoral systems, the macroeconomic index “GDP per capita growth rate”, and the electoral outcome of the incumbent party is to be examined with the multiple regression analysis in this thesis. Compared with “the semi-presidential and the plurality system”, it is unveiled in this thesis that “the not semi-presidential and the plurality system” and the economic voting reach the statistical significance for the reason of institutional conditions such as “the clarity of the political responsibility” and “the adequate chance of electoral accountability.” While the PR, even along with the presidential which retains an adequate chance of the electoral accountability, fails to show the statistical significance with the economic voting. Furthermore, if we look into institutional intersections and make a distinction between economic-voting-friendly and economic-voting-unfriendly, “the semi-presidential and the plurality system”, compared to whether “the non-presidential and the PR” or “the presidential and the PR”, merely entails the happening of economic voting because of the unstable clarity of the political responsibility and the inadequate chance of electoral accountability. After a series of adjustments in independent variables, the consequences of the examination remained the same, and this thesis, in this way, survived the robustness test. The research results are therefore more refined and convincing. In sum, the intersectional consideration between the government regimes and the electoral systems, due to the electoral outcome of the incumbent party, indeed takes a major part in the economic voting. The sufficient institutional conditions will elevate the possibility of the economic voting.