法律行為解釋之理論與實務--以契約之解釋為中心

Abstract

本論文為法律行為解釋於方法論上之研究，並以契約之解釋為研究重心，企圖針對此議題提供一結合理論研究與實務觀察此二面向之完整之研究。 「法律解釋」與「法律行為解釋」同為法學領域中重要的解釋活動，且前者於方法論上之研究，早有長足之發展。本文認為，只要考量解釋對象之不同而為相應之調整，法律解釋之方法應可沿用於法律行為之解釋上。 我國民法第98條規定法律行為之解釋，本條應係繼受自德國民法第133、157條。本文認為不論係解釋須受領或無須受領之意思表示，法官於訴訟上皆係規範性解釋當事人之意思表示，亦即探尋一客觀合理之人，參酌個案中所有具體客觀情事(解釋因素)後應有之理解為何，故實際上不存在德國學說所謂的經驗性解釋。此外，各解釋因素間雖不存在固定的位階關係，但本文認為，若得從個案情事推得當事人之契約目的，即應優先採取最符合契約目的之解釋。關於契約漏洞之填補，本文則認為得參考德國法上相關理論，並得以我國民法第153條第2項後段及第148條第2項作為法律上之依據。 至於我國實務之情形，觀察我國最高法院之相關裁判可知，其大致上已認知到應採取客觀規範解釋方法。然而，大部分的裁判仍未將個案中之解釋因素盡可能地納入參酌，甚至常見援引最高法院17年上字第1118號判例見解而僅以契約文義作為解釋之依據。此外，法院大多未認識當事人之契約可能存在漏洞，關於漏洞填補之方法亦過於簡略。是以，仍有許多值得檢討改進之處。

This thesis is a study on the Methodology of the interpretation of juridical acts, which mainly focuses on the interpretation of contracts, and aims to present a complete study combining theory and practice. “Legal interpretation” and “the interpretation of juridical acts” are both important acts of interpretation in jurisprudence. I consider that, with moderate adjustment, the method of legeal interpretation can also be applied to interpret juridical acts. The interpretation of juridical acts is defined in article 98 of Civil Code (Taiwan) and this can be traced back to article 133 and 157 of German Civil Code. In my opinion, when interpreting a declaration of intention, the courts should apply an objective and normative approach, whether there is a recipient or not. That is, the courts should discover the meaning which a reasonable person should understand after taking all the relevant circumstances into account. Though there is no stable rank between different elements(criterion) of interpretation, if the purpose of the contract can be deduced from the circumstances, the meaning which accords with the contractual purpose most should take priority. As to the contractual gap filling, relevant theories in Germany are worth considering. With regard to the practice of our supreme courts, many courts have recognized the necessity of objective-normative interpretation. Nevertheless, most of the courts still neglect to take all the relevant circumstances into consideration. Besides, several courts accorded to the precedent No. 1118 (Supreme Court, 1928) and thus took the literal meaning of the expressions as the only criterion. Moreover, most of the courts have not learned the concept of contractual gap. Even though they had learned about it, the method of gap filling is still insufficient. Consequently, there is still a lot to improve.