Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/5209
Title: | 績效權益薪酬的衡量期間與審計公費 Performance Horizon of Performance-contingent Equity Awards and Audit Fees |
Authors: | Pei-Hsuan Li 李佩璇 |
Advisor: | 許文馨(Wen-Hsin Hsu) |
Keyword: | 衡量期間,績效權益薪酬,審計品質,執行長薪酬, Performance horizon,Performance-contingent equity award,Audit fee,CEO compensation, |
Publication Year : | 2014 |
Degree: | 碩士 |
Abstract: | 本文主旨在研究績效權益薪酬的衡量期間與審計公費間的關係。過去文獻指出,短期紅利計畫和管理者間的盈餘操縱具有正向關係(e.g. Healy, 1985; Gaver et al., 1995),短期績效指標也因容易導致管理階層為了極大化自身的利益,而做出傷害公司長期發展的決策,長久以來為人所詬病(e.g., Bushman et al., 1996; Ittner et al., 1997)。近年來,權益薪酬的使用越趨廣泛,許多文獻開始探討權益薪酬帶來的動機和盈餘管理間的關係(e.g. Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Armstrong, Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor, 2013)。然而,鮮少文獻探討權益薪酬導致盈餘管理可能是因為衡量期間長短不同所導致。因此,本研究結合審計公費和薪酬制度的相關文獻,探討是否對審計人員而言,短衡量期間的權益薪酬,會提高盈餘管理的風險,進而使公費增加。本研究結果指出,當管理階層的績效權益薪酬中,有屬於短期衡量的部分,對審計人員而言,其盈餘管理的風險較高;而長期績效指標的個數,則和審計公費成反向關係。 This study examines how performance horizon of CEO’sperformance-contingent equity compensation affects the risk assessment of auditors, in turn, affect audit fees. Prior literatures (e.g. Healy, 1985; Gaver et al., 1995) indicate that short-term performance-contingent awards such as bonus plans, make higher incentives of earnings management. Recent years, many studies (e.g. Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Armstrong, Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor, 2013)find a positive relation between equity incentives and financial misreporting. However, they do not examine whether the results can depend on the performance period of equity incentives.In addition, many studies (Gul et al., 2003; Bedard and Johnstone, 2004) show that auditors charge higher audit fees from clients with lower reporting quality and a higher likelihood of financial misreporting. Therefore, I combine these two strands of literatures to examine whetherperformance-contingent equity awards are related to audit fees. First, I examine whether the risk of misreporting is higher if there is any performance-contingent equity award that have a short performance period, which means that the performance period is within one year, and the results support my hypothesis. I further examine the number of long-term performance measures and audit fees, and the results indicate a negative association. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/5209 |
Fulltext Rights: | 同意授權(全球公開) |
Appears in Collections: | 會計學系 |
Files in This Item:
File | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|
ntu-103-1.pdf | 630.8 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.