具有商品稀缺性之供應鏈合約設計分析

Abstract

目前市場中在上游供應商與下游製造商之間存在各種單價與訂購量之合約，但大多文獻為研究單一種負向的價量關係，因此本研究根據現實生活中的情況，探討商品零組件具有正向與負向價量關係之合約。當零件供應鏈上游產能驟減、供給量突然面臨嚴格限制，或者下游需求突然超出預期（亦即供應鏈發生中斷），造成零件供應呈現正向的價量關係，此時零件稱為“稀缺性資源”，反之則稱為“非稀缺性資源”。本研究以Stackelberg模型為基礎，應用期望值之觀念，建構兩階層之供應鏈模型，並假設存在一家上游供應商與多家下游製造商，以及假定製造商間可能存在Cournot競爭。本研究探討單一價格費率與區段價格費率之兩種不同計價方式對供應商利潤之影響。由於無法準確預測零件何時變為稀缺性資源，故供應商在制訂價量關係之合約時，應同時考量其零件具有稀缺性資源與非稀缺性資源之可能。供應商考量供應鏈中斷的可能，並決定商品零組件合約的價量關係，係為先行者，而製造商獲得價量關係的資訊後，決定自身之訂購量，係為跟隨者。本研究旨在提供供應商面對潛在之供應鏈中斷時，如何最大化自身利潤之合約設計，探討供應商決策的管理意含，以及透過參數分析探討其趨勢。

A variety types of contracts are applied in current business market. Much work has been done on contracts studying the negative relationship between price and quantity, while little has considered the positive and negative relationship together. This article investigates the contracts for potential scarce components with two charging schemes. A scarce component occurs in supply or demand disruption, with the price and total ordering quantity positively correlated. Otherwise, the components we call non-scarce components, with the price and total ordering quantity negatively correlated. A potential scarce component is the component may be scarce in the future but no one can predict when the component will become scarce. This research applies the concept of the Stackelberg-type model with or without Cournot competition to construct a two-tier supply chain model. The upstream supplier acting as the leader decides the contract of potential scarce components. Then the downstream manufacturers, being informed of contract information and market situations, places an order of the components. We analytically show that our contract can be applied to the potential scarce components with the probability of the supply disrupted. The strategies for the supplier are provided to compare its profits and decisions under the concern of the supply chain disruption. Some characteristics of the equilibrium decisions and managerial insights are suggested for the supplier.