公司聲譽與高階經理人獎酬之實證研究

Abstract

本研究之目的係探討公司的聲譽與高階經理人獎酬之關聯性。本文以台灣上市以及上櫃公司為研究對象，樣本期間為2005年至2014年。實證結果顯示，當公司的聲譽越好時，高階經理人具有越高之超額薪酬水準，可能反映聲譽較佳之企業其經理人亦具有較高能力。此外，當以資產報酬率為績效代表變數時，企業之聲望評價與高階經理人之薪酬績效敏感度呈現顯著正相關，支持聲譽較佳之企業會提高薪酬與會計績效之連結度以減少代理問題。本研究結果在考量自我選擇之後仍維持穩健。

This study investigates whether corporate reputation is associated with CEO compensation. The sample includes publicly-traded Taiwanese companies from 2005 to 2014. The empirical results indicate that firms with higher reputation give CEOs higher levels of excess compensation. This findings may reflect that CEOs in more reputable firms have higher capability leading to greater compensation levels. In addition, we find that there is a significantly positive association between corporate reputation and pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation when performance is measured by return on assets. The results suggest that more reputable firms increase the link between CEO pay and accounting performance to reduce agency problems. All the empirical results are robust to controlling for potential self-selection bias resulting from using the most-admired firms as the measure for corporate reputation.