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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 廖芝嫻 | |
dc.contributor.author | I-Chin Huang | en |
dc.contributor.author | 黃以晴 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-15T13:11:00Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2026-12-31 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2016-07-25 | |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2016-06-26 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 一、 中文部分
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/50989 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本研究之目的係探討公司的聲譽與高階經理人獎酬之關聯性。本文以台灣上市以及上櫃公司為研究對象,樣本期間為2005年至2014年。實證結果顯示,當公司的聲譽越好時,高階經理人具有越高之超額薪酬水準,可能反映聲譽較佳之企業其經理人亦具有較高能力。此外,當以資產報酬率為績效代表變數時,企業之聲望評價與高階經理人之薪酬績效敏感度呈現顯著正相關,支持聲譽較佳之企業會提高薪酬與會計績效之連結度以減少代理問題。本研究結果在考量自我選擇之後仍維持穩健。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | This study investigates whether corporate reputation is associated with CEO compensation. The sample includes publicly-traded Taiwanese companies from 2005 to 2014. The empirical results indicate that firms with higher reputation give CEOs higher levels of excess compensation. This findings may reflect that CEOs in more reputable firms have higher capability leading to greater compensation levels. In addition, we find that there is a significantly positive association between corporate reputation and pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation when performance is measured by return on assets. The results suggest that more reputable firms increase the link between CEO pay and accounting performance to reduce agency problems. All the empirical results are robust to controlling for potential self-selection bias resulting from using the most-admired firms as the measure for corporate reputation. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-15T13:11:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-105-R03722023-1.pdf: 997509 bytes, checksum: 1977e5ff45f7d3169f5e70d2e6fce714 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 謝辭 i
摘要 ii Abstract iii 目錄 iv 第一章 緒論 1 第二章 文獻回顧 4 第一節 聲望相關文獻 4 第二節 經理人薪酬相關文獻 6 第三節 公司治理與經理人薪酬 8 第四節 研究假說 10 第三章 研究設計 13 第一節 變數定義與衡量 13 第二節 實證模型 18 第三節 樣本與資料來源 22 第四章 迴歸結果 24 第一節 敘述性統計 24 第二節 單變量分析 26 第三節 實證結果 31 第五章 額外測試 36 第一節 Heckman兩階段迴歸 36 第二節 以聲望標竿企業評鑑分數衡量 42 第六章 研究結論與限制 46 第一節 研究結論 46 第二節 研究限制及建議 47 參考文獻 49 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 公司聲譽與高階經理人獎酬之實證研究 | zh_TW |
dc.title | An Empirical Study of Company Reputation and Executive Compensation | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 104-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 吳淑鈴,詹凌菁 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 企業聲望,標竿企業,高階經理人獎酬,超額薪酬,薪酬績效敏感度, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | corporate reputation,most admired firms,CEO compensation,excess compensation,pay-performance sensitivity, | en |
dc.relation.page | 57 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201600507 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2016-06-27 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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