內生提案者的議事規則及平均分配

Abstract

本文提出了一個動態三人集體決策模型，其中反對現狀者將會在下一期被賦予提案權。我們找到了一個的均衡，於該均衡路徑上，提案者會隨機的挑選餘下的任一人並形成聯盟。該聯盟能持續至無限期，同時成員間會公平地分配所有資源。

In this article we propose a collective decision making model in a dynamic environment with 3 players and the political rule that only gives the agenda-setting power in the next period to those who vote against the current status quo when first time it took effect. We show that, in equilibrium we derive, the agenda setter will randomly choose his supporter to form a minimum winning coalition which could carry on forever and the payoff distribution among that coalition is egalitarian and fair in some cases.