請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/49611完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 馮勃翰(Po-Han Fong) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Cheng-Yu Shih | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 施正祐 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-15T11:37:36Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-08-25 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2016-08-25 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2016-08-16 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | References
[1] Baron, David P. and John Ferejohn. 1989. ”Bargaining in Legislatures.”American Political Science Review, 83(4): 1181-1206. [2] Diermeier, Daniel and Pohan Fong. 2011. ”Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration.”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(2): 947-985. [3] Knight, Brian. 2005. ”Estimating the Value of Proposal Power.”American Economic Review, 95: 1639-1652. [4] Romer, Thomas and Howard Rosenthal. 1978. ”Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo.”Public Choice, 33(4): 27-43. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/49611 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本文提出了一個動態三人集體決策模型，其中反對現狀者將會在下一期被賦予提案權。我們找到了一個的均衡，於該均衡路徑上，提案者會隨機的挑選餘下的任一人並形成聯盟。該聯盟能持續至無限期，同時成員間會公平地分配所有資源。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | In this article we propose a collective decision making model in a dynamic environment with 3 players and the political rule that only gives the agenda-setting power in the next period to those who vote against the current status quo when first time it took effect. We show that, in equilibrium we derive, the agenda setter will randomly choose his supporter to form a minimum winning coalition which could carry on forever and the payoff distribution among that coalition is egalitarian and fair in some cases. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-15T11:37:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-105-R02323008-1.pdf: 463614 bytes, checksum: a08d957c44dd5691df749d7d1a2581b6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Contents
Verification letter from the Oral Examination Committee i Acknowledgement ii Chinese Abstract iii Abstract iv Contents v 1 Introduction 1 2 The Model 2 3 Equilibrium Definition 3 4 Analysis 4 5 Conclusion 6 6 Appendix 7 References 13 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 集體決策 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 提案權 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 聯盟 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公平 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | coalition | en |
| dc.subject | egalitarian | en |
| dc.subject | agenda-setting power | en |
| dc.subject | collective decision making | en |
| dc.title | 內生提案者的議事規則及平均分配 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | EGALITARIAN PAYOFF DISTRIBUTION IN LEGISLATIVE BARGAINING WITH 3 PLAYERS AND ENDOGENOUS AGENDA SETTERS | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 104-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 蔡崇聖(Tsung-Sheng Tsai),吳聰敏(Tsong-Min Wu) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 集體決策,提案權,聯盟,公平, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | collective decision making,agenda-setting power,coalition,egalitarian, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 13 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201602603 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2016-08-16 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 經濟學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 經濟學系 | |
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