家族企業與企業社會責任績效

Abstract

本研究主要探討家族企業與企業社會責任績效之關聯性，並進一步將樣本依據公司治理品質之好壞加以區分，探討公司治理是否會強化（或削弱）上述之關聯性。本文以西元2004年起至2013年止共計十個年度之美國上市公司為研究樣本進行分析。研究結果顯示，家族企業相較於非家族企業，有較差之企業社會責任績效，支持利益掠奪假說，亦即家族企業面臨較高的型二代理問題。此外，本研究發現上述較差的企業社會責任績效，主要來自於公司治理較差的家族企業，換言之較佳之公司治理確實可減弱家族企業之利益掠奪行為。

The objective of this research is to investigate the association between family firms and corporate social performance and whether corporate governance moderates this association. The sample includes U.S. listed companies from 2004 to 2013. The empirical results show that family firms have weaker corporate social performance than non-family firms. This finding is consistent with the notion of entrenchment effect, which means family firms have greater conflict of interest between controlling insiders and non-controlling outside investors (i.e., Type 2 agency problem). We also find that the above association mainly comes from poorly-governed family firms, suggesting that better corporate governance can mitigate the Type 2 agency problem.