弗雷格「意涵」之掌握與演變

Abstract

在本篇論文，我將關注弗雷格意涵的認知面相。弗雷格的意涵是所謂一語詞呈現對象的方式。根據這樣的論點，我會指出索引詞以及引述用詞的意涵是規範這些與使用的規則；專名的意涵則是指認對象的判準，若非掌握這些判準，便無法宣稱掌握該專明的使用。 我將檢視幾個弗雷格理論的困難，包括與意外部論的論證，指出意涵不足以決定指涉對象；以及克里普其反對專名具有意涵的論證。我將承認說，如果要保存所謂的認知面相，語意外部論的論證必須被接受；但是代價是必須放棄意涵決定指涉對象。面對克里普其的論證，我會強調說，專明的認知面相不應當被略；更進一步來說，結合了專名的意涵作為指認對象的條件，以及專名的意涵可以演變、結合、出錯，克里普其的論證可以被解消。 承認意涵可以改變、結合並不會妨礙溝通的可能性。這是因為學習這些不同的意涵，必定是從其他使用者的使用學習，因此意涵在原則上可以被掌握。因此，溝通的可能性仍然被保存。

In this article, I will focus on the cognitive aspect of Frege’s notion of sense. Frege’s sense is understood as the mode of presentation of an expression. Accordingly, I will show that sense of indexicals and expressions used in indirect discourse are the rules governing the uses of those expressions; and the sense of proper names is the criteria of identification, without mastering of which one could not claim to have master the use of the proper name. I will also examine some of the main difficulties against the Fregean account, such as externalistic arguments showing that sense does not determine reference, and Kripkean arguments against the senses of proper names. I admit that the externalistic arguments are successful if the cognitive value is to be preserved, but hold that the determination thesis is not essential to Frege. With regard to the Kripkean arguments, I will show that the epistemic aspect of proper names should not be ignored; furthermore, by understanding that the sense is some criteria the reference is identified, combined with the fact that senses could change and merge, and are open to error, the Kripkean arguments could be dissolved. The acceptance of the changing and merging of sense does not lead to the conclusion that sense is subjective. Since the learning of the mastering of expressions necessarily comes from other users, it is in principle conveyable and thus graspable. The possibility of communication is thereby preserved.