企業倂購決策與經理人過度自信之關聯性分析

Abstract

本文探討經理人過度自信特質對於企業併購決策之影響以及其市場反應。經理人因具有過度自信特質，高估其進行經營決策時所能創造價值之能力，致使進行過多而品質相對低落的併購決策，而面臨較差的市場反應。我們檢視1996至2006年間，673間美國公司及其併購決策，發現過度自信經理人具有較高進行併購的傾向；同時當擁有較低決策獨裁權時，過度自信經理人呈現更高的併購傾向。在市場的反應方面，對過度自信經理人併購事件宣告的反應，相對於非過度自信經理人為差。

This study examines the effect of CEO overconfidence on merger decisions and the corresponding market responses. Overconfident CEOs tend to overestimate their ability in generating value. Hence, there is a greater chance that they conduct more mergers with a lower-than-average quality and sequentially poorer market responses. We study 673 US firms and their merger bids during 1996 and 2006. The empirical results show that overconfident CEOs are more likely to conduct mergers. This is more evident when the overconfident CEOs are in firms with lower managerial power. The market reacts significantly more negative to the mergers announced by overconfident CEOs than those by rational CEOs.