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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | (Ken Yaotsung Chen) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Suyanto | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 蘇陽托 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-15T00:41:25Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2009-11-20 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2008-11-20 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2008-11-06 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | AICPA. 2007. AU Section 316: Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. AICPA.
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Jones, and M. F. Zimbelman. 2007. Using Nonfinancial Measures to Assess Fraud Risk. In Working Paper: North Carolina State University, George Mason University, and Brigham Young University, 45. Carmichael, D. R. 1999. Hocus-Pocus Accounting. Journal of Accountancy October:59-65. Chen, K. Y., and R. J. Elder. 2007. Fraud Risk Factors and the Likelihood of Fraudulent Financial Reporting:Evidence from Statement on Auditing Standards No. 43 in Taiwan. In Working Paper: National Taiwan University and Syracuse University, 36. Cressey, D. R. 1953. Other people's money : a study in the social psychology of embezzlement / by Donald R. Cressey. Glencoe, Illinois : the Free Press DeFond, M. L. 1992. The Association Between Changes in Client Firm Agency Costs and Auditor Switching. Auditing: A Journal of Practice 11 (1):16-31. Ellingsen, J. E., K. Pany, and P. Fagan. 1989. SAS no. 59: How to Evaluate Going Concern. Journal of Accountancy January:24-31. Fama, E. F., and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics 26 (2):301-325. Farber, D. B. 2005. Restoring Trust after Fraud: Does Corporate Governance Matter? The Accounting Review 80 (2):539-561. Francis, J. R. 1999. Accounting Accraals and Auditor Reporting Conservatism. Contemporary Accounting Research 16 (1):135-165. Ge, W., and S. McVay.2005. The disclosure of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Accounting Horizons 19(3): 137-158. Hopwood, W., J. McKeown, and J. Mutchler. 1989. A Test of the Incremental Explanatory Power of Opinions Qualified for Consistency and Uncertainty. The Accounting Review 64 (1):28-48. Johnson, W. B. and Lys T. 1990. The market for audit services: evidence from voluntary auditor changes. Journal of Accounting and Economics 12 (January). Kaminski, K. A., T. S. Wetzel, and L. Guan. 2004. Can Financial Ratio Detect Fraudulent Financial Reporting? Managerial Auditing Journal 19 (1):15-28. Kirkos, E., C. Spathis, and Y. Manolopoulos. 2007. Data Mining Techniques for the Detection of Fraudulent Financial Statements. Expert Systems with Applications 32:995–1003. Klein, A. 2002. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33:375–400. Kreutzfeldt, R., and. Wallace, W. 1986. Error Characteristics in Audit Populations: Their Profile and Relationship to Environment Factors. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory. Fall: 20-43 Krishnan, J., and J. Krishnan. 1997. Litigation Risk and Auditor Resignations. The Accounting Review 70 (4):539-560. Kuruppu, N., F. Laswad, and P. Oyelere. 2003. The efficacy of liquidation and bankruptcy models for assessing going concern. Managerial Auditing Journal 18(6/7): 577-590. Loebbecke, J. K., M. M. Eining, and J. J. Willingham. 1989. Auditors' Experience with Material Irregularities: Frequency, Nature, and Detectability Auditing: A Journal of Practice 9 (1):1-28. Palepu, K. G. 1986. 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Contemporaneous Risk Factors and the Prediction of Financial Statement Fraud. In Working Paper: University of Texas at Arlington and Oklahoma State University, 41. St. Pierre, K., and Anderson, J. 1984.An Analysis of the Factors Associated with Lawsuits Against Public Accountants. The Accounting Review. April: 242-263. Stice, J. D. 1991. Using Financial and Market Information to Identify Pre-Engagement Factors Associated with Lawsuits against Auditors. The Accounting Review 66 (3):516-533. Uzun, H., S. H. Szewczyk, and R. Varma. 2003. Board Composition and Corporate Fraud. Financial Analysts Journal May/June:33-43. Vermeer, T. E. 2003. The Impact of SAS No. 82 on an Auditor’s Tolerance of Earnings Management. Journal of Forensic Accounting 14:21-34. Young, B. 2005. Related-Party Transactions: Why They Matter and What Is Disclosed. The Corporate Governance Advisor 13 (4):1-7. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/42002 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本研究之目的乃透過實證方法去辨認財務報表舞弊的風險因素，並且以美國會計師協會查核準則第99號公報為依據，建立一個模型以預測財務報表舞弊之可能性。決定舞弊有三個因素：壓力(Pressure)、機會(Opportunity)和合理化(Rationalization)。透過Logit模型分析探討143間公司，本實證結果顯示對於壓力之代理變數，像是資產報酬率，以及機會之代理變數，像是存貨對總資產之比率、關係企業交易、以及四大事務所，皆與財務報表舞弊有顯著相關。然而，沒有任何一個針對合理化此舞弊風險因素之代理變數是與財務報表舞弊顯著相關的。與學術上先前之研究結果一致，壓力與機會之代理變數相較於合理化之代理變數更能使財務報表舞弊之可能性被大眾所觀察。所建立之模型能正確地分類有相對較高成功機率的公司。更有甚者，值得注意的是財務報表舞弊之可能性與沙氏法案第302條以及第404條制定前後無攸關的差異。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | The goals of this study are to empirically identify fraud risk factors and construct a model to predict the likelihood of financial statement fraud based on SAS No. 99. By employing logistic regression to 143 firms, this research finds that fraud risk factor proxies for Pressure—i.e. net profit/total assets—and Opportunity— inventory/total assets ratio, related party transaction, and Big 4—are significantly associated with fraudulent financial statement, whereas none of the fraud risk factor proxies for Rationalization is significantly associated with fraudulent financial statement. Consistent with prior research, it seems that the likelihood of fraudulent financial statement is easier to be publicly observed by using fraud risk factor proxies for Pressure and Opportunity rather than Rationalization. The constructed model can correctly classify firms with relatively high success rate. Furthermore, it is important to note that no relevant difference could be established before and after the enactment of SOA’s Section 302 and Section 404 toward the likelihood of fraudulent financial statement. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-15T00:41:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-97-R95722047-1.pdf: 1463410 bytes, checksum: e18adf483d42d5308527860d5f99837d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Abstract v
Chapter 1: Introduction 1 Chapter 2: Theory and Hypotheses Development 4 Pressure Variables 7 1. Financial Leverage - Total Liability/Total Assets (LEV) 7 2. Capital Turnover - Sales/Total Assets (SALTA) 8 3. Profitability - Net Profit/Total Assets (NPROFTA) 8 Opportunity Variables 9 1. Related Party Transaction (RPTRANS) 9 2. Big 4 (BIG4) 10 3. Inventory/Total Assets (INVTA) 10 Rationalization Variables 11 1. Auditor Change (CPA) 12 2. Audit Opinion (AO) 12 3. Going Concern (GC) 13 Chapter 3: Sample Selection and Description 15 Fraud Firm Selection 15 Comparing Fraud Firms to No-Fraud Firms 16 Chapter 4: Research Design 18 Chapter 5: Empirical Results and Additional Analyses 20 Regression Result 20 Model 1: Pressure 21 Model 2: Opportunity 21 Model 3: Rationalization 21 Model 4: Full Regression of Fraud Triangle 22 Additional Analysis 22 Predictive Fraud Model and Robustness 22 The Effects of the Enactment of Sarbanes Oxley Act 24 Chapter 6: Conclusion 25 Reference 29 List of Appendix Appendix 1: Example of Fraud Risk Factors in SAS No. 99 30 Appendix 2: List of Sample Firms 31 List of Table Table 1: Sample Selection Method 34 Table 2: Descriptive Statistic 35 Table 3: T-tests and Wilcoxon Sign-Rank Test 36 Table 4: Correlations among Dependent and Independent Variables 38 Table 5: Initial Logistic Regression 41 Table 6: Logistic Regression of the Likelihood of Fraudulent Financial Reporting 42 Table 7: Fraud Prediction Model 44 Table 8: Discriminate Analysis 45 Table 9: The Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 46 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 欺詐三角形 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 欺詐風險因素 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 的SAS 99 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 財務報表的欺詐行為 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | financial statement fraud | en |
| dc.subject | fraud risk factors | en |
| dc.subject | SAS 99 | en |
| dc.subject | fraud triangle | en |
| dc.title | 舞弊風險因子與欺詐財務報表的可能性
—以SAS No.99為證 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Fraud Risk Factors and the Likelihood of Fraudulent Financial Reporting: Evidence from Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99 | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 96-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | (Chih Yang Tseng),(Wang Wann Cherng) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 財務報表的欺詐行為,欺詐三角形,的SAS 99,欺詐風險因素, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | financial statement fraud,fraud triangle,SAS 99,fraud risk factors, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 57 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2008-11-07 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
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| ntu-97-1.pdf 未授權公開取用 | 1.43 MB | Adobe PDF |
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