獨立董事薪酬制度研究-考慮經營者與獨立董事勾結的可能性-

Abstract

本文建構一理論模型探討有關獨立董事薪酬制度議題。本文證明：在企業經營者即為主要股東的情形時，只要獨立董事的薪酬及經營者的持股比率能充分揭露，即可避免經營者與獨立董事勾結，使獨立董事的機制可有效解決代理問題，降低企業投資計畫的融資成本，給予經營者聘任獨立董事的誘因。 當僅考量獨立董事防弊功能時，其所領取薪酬暨其餘參與者的預期報酬，不因經營者給付型態(固定薪或變動薪)不同而有所差異。將獨立董事興利功能納入考量時，我們發現以變動薪酬方式給付獨立董事，雖然提供較佳的誘因，使獨立董事創造較大的計畫價值，但也同時提升其與經營者勾結的可能性；以固定薪酬方式給付獨立董事，雖然興利功能較差，但因領取薪酬為固定值，其獨立性不受影響，防弊效果較佳。

We develop a model to study independent directors’ compensation. It is shown that, even if a controlling shareholder may collude with independent directors he hires, appointing independent directors still could alleviate agency problem and reduce the corporation’s financing cost effectively. If we only take independent directors’ supervisory function into consideration, we find how they get paid doesn’t matter. But if independent directors have both supervisory and advising functions, variable compensation may be more beneficial to corporation, but it increases the possibility of collusion simultaneously.