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標題: | 政府採購法各種決標方式執行情形之分析 The Implementation Analysis of Awarding Principles in Government Procurement Act |
作者: | Hsin-Jui Chen 陳信瑞 |
指導教授: | 郭斯傑 |
關鍵字: | 政府採購,決標方式,標比值,異質採購最低標, Price Bidding,Lowest Tender,Procurement,Different Quality Subjects, |
出版年 : | 2008 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 政府採購法自88年5月27日施行迄今已逾9年,針對政府採購所採行決標方式於實務執行情形之分析探討卻較少,本論文嘗試藉由自政府採購資訊公告系統決標資料庫蒐集91年至96年間各機關實際辦理採購案件之決標資料,分析各種決標方式之變化趨勢。另工程會所創設之異質採購最低標決標方式,與最低標及最有利標之差異及實際執行情形之比較,亦為本論文探討重點。
據本論文統計結果,政府採購年平均件數為17萬9,600件,年平均決標金額為1兆0,325億元,採行最有利標之比率約15%,最低標約85%。以變化趨勢而言,各年度採行最有利標之比率,於91年至94年呈現遞增之趨勢,95年及96年則呈現遞減之趨勢;而採行最低標者,則呈現相反之趨勢。 為瞭解最低標著重於價格競爭機制、最有利標著重於評選擇優機制及異質採購最低標兼具評分淘汰機制及價格競爭機制對於決標結果之影響,經本研究統計結果,異質採購最低標之決標金額與底價之平均標比值為89.84%,遠低於最有利標(99.27%)而與最低標(91.64%)相近,顯示該決標方式確可藉由價格競爭機制,達成降低決標金額而節省經費之目的。再經分析採異質採購最低標之實際執行情形,經審查委員會採評分機制淘汰未達及格分數之廠商家數比率為33.78%;經評分機制發揮淘汰廠商功能之案件比率為66.67%.顯示異質採購最低標確可藉由評分機制淘汰部分廠商,達成篩選各審查項目表現較佳廠商之目的。另針對異質採購最低標決標方式於法無據之質疑,本研究亦提出建議對策及相關法令修正草案。 The Government Procurement Act has been enforced over 9 years since May 27, 1999; however, tender awarding methods in government procurement are rarely analyzed and discussed. This thesis intends to analyze the variation and tendency of tender awarding methods by collecting information on government procurement bids data of entity from the Government Procurement Information System. In addition, it also focuses on comparing the differences and practical execution among three tender awarding methods--the lowest tender, the most advantageous tender and the lowest tender in the procurement of different quality subjects. According to our statistical results, the average number of government procurement cases is 179,600 per year, with an average tender awarding value of 103.25 million NT dollars. About 15% of the government procurement cases are determined with the most advantageous tender, and 85% are determined with the lowest tender. We find that: (1) the ratio of cases determined with the advantageous tender increases gradually from 2002 to 2005, and decreases gradually from 2006 to 2007; (2) the ratio of cases determined with the lowest tender presents an inverse tendency. The tender awarding method determining the lowest tender in the procurement of different quality subjects possesses both mechanisms of appraisal elimination and price competition. Then, we will discuss how these mechanisms affect the outcome of an award by statistical results. To begin with, we find that the average tender awarding value to base price bidding ratio of the lowest tender in the procurement of different quality subjects is 89.84%, which is much lower than that of the most advantageous tender(99.27%) but close to that of the lowest tender(91.64%). The result indicates that this awarding method can decrease the awarding value and save budget by price competition mechanism. Furthermore, we analyze the practical execution of the lowest tender in the procurement of different quality subject cases; the ratio that the evaluation committee adopts evaluation mechanism to eliminate the firms failed to pass is 33.78%, while the ratio through the appraisal mechanism to eliminate some suppliers is 66.67%. It shows that this awarding method can screen the better performance suppliers in all evaluation items by eliminating some suppliers with the evaluation mechanism. Finally, this thesis tried to provide some suggestive strategies and amendments of relevant laws and regulations to deal with the issue concerning the legal basis of this awarding method. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/37475 |
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顯示於系所單位: | 土木工程學系 |
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