聲譽考量之模仿行為:關於決策問題難易的影響

Abstract

經理人傾向與同業的其他經理人作出相同的投資決策，本論文對此現象提出一個新的解釋。當社會大眾對經理人所面對的決策問題難度不確定時，經理人有誘因和同業採取相同的投資決策。如果他們的投資決策在事後看來是不明智的，社會大眾會因為多數的經理人都做了錯誤的投資決定，而認為這個決策問題很困難，使得經理人的名譽(或報酬)不會因為錯誤的決策而遭到很大的損傷。若能力強的經理人在相對簡單的決策問題上具有資訊優勢，經理人傾向互相模仿。反之，若能力強的經理人在相對困難的決策問題具有資訊優勢，模仿行為將會消失。

In this thesis, we offer a new interpretation of“sharing-the-blame”effect.If the public is uncertain about how difficult managers’decision problems are, managers share the blame when many of them make mistakes in the same investment decision because this decision problem seems more difficult. This effect gives each manager an incentive to mimic other managers’decisions. We show that“sharing-the-blame”effect causes herding behaviors if capable managers have an information advantage in relatively simple problems. However, if capable managers have an information advantage in relatively difficult problems, herding behaviors no longer occurs.