民營化之兩階段競標

Abstract

對參與公股競標的競標者而言，綜效和私有利得是決定競標者出價的兩大主因，而採取一次性的競標或兩階段的競標影響了政府和競標者的決策。隨著政府宣佈取得控制權的股份的多寡不但影響了兩兆的決策，也影響了國庫收入。在本文中探討政府在面臨外在環境的因素以及得標者所可能採取之傷害併後公司的舉動下，所該選擇之最佳決策，以及其中之結果和發現可適時的解釋和運用在世界各國民營化之過程中政府所採行的某些決策上。

I analyzed optimal schemes for privatization of state-owned enterprises using two-tier auction. Two independent forces, the expected synergy generated and private benefits obtained by the acquirer, affect the bidder’s bids and bid-taker’s revenue. Moreover, the government has to be concerned about the auction approach it adopts since it will affect the expected revenue. In this paper, based on game theory literature and microeconomic theory, I showed the two-tier auction dominates one-stage auction under a certain condition. Besides, to announce how many initial shares bidders should buy affects the bidders’ bid and the profit allocation between the bidder and the bid-taker. In order to obtain maximum expected return, the government should make the determination on a case by case basis and some implications of results in this paper can explain some cases of privatization around the world.