資本市場中的資訊不對稱－從財務資訊不實的外部監控與刑事責任談起

Abstract

近年來，關於財務資訊不實的犯罪行為，在世界各國的資本市場上層出不窮。如何有效防堵相關的經濟犯罪行為，已成為現今公司治理法制上的熱門議題。事實上，從資訊經濟學的角度來看，財務資訊（無論是歷史性資訊或是預測性資訊）不實的犯罪行為，實際上乃係源自於「本人－代理人」此種代理關係底下的「資訊不對稱」結構。而由於一般論理上均認為，適當的資訊揭露本身，將有助於代理成本的降低，以避免資本市場因代理成本等交易成本過高，而導致市場失靈的結果。準此，在法律規範架構中，針對公司治理或其他場域所設計的各種機制（無論是內部監控機制或是外部監控機制），本質上均是為了降低因代理關係所生之代理成本而設。 就外部監控中刑事責任規範而言，對於財務資訊（包含歷史性財務資訊以及具有「前瞻性」的財務預測資訊）虛偽不實等證券詐欺犯罪，有鑑於普通詐欺罪等傳統刑事規範多係採「實害犯」之規範模式，導致在個案之中，關於損害與因果關係的認定或證立上顯有困難，因此，為了彌補傳統法制在規範面上的不足，證券交易法等特殊規範中進而採用「危險構成要件」或「行為犯」等特殊型態的規範模式與結構來加以管制。然而，對於財務資訊不實等證券詐欺犯罪，由於我國證券交易法等特殊法制在繼受國外法制的過程中，經過許多轉折，導致在規範關係與架構上錯綜複雜。因此，就回顧性的觀點來看，本論文透過規範法益的確立，並配合我國立法當初所繼受的國外法制、我國多年來運作的司法實務見解，以及資訊經濟學上的觀點，藉以說明並分析我國證券交易法等相關特殊規範，並認定該等規範與其他規範（例如刑法偽造文書罪、背信罪或商業會計法中的相關歸定）間的法律競合關係。本論文擬透過此一分析過程，指明現行規範上的不足與缺失，並提出修法的具體建議。 其次，回歸到本論文的核心議題－經濟犯罪的本質與特殊性。由於刑法的規範目的與本質，乃是在於「管制風險」，而非「禁止風險的絕對不發生」。而事實上，資訊不對稱結構的產生，乃係基於資本市場或甚至是整個社會結構底下的本質所使然。因此，本論文認為，如欲以抽象危險犯或行為犯此等強度甚高的犯罪概念來管制提出不實財務資訊的行為，刑罰權勢必得適度地節制。準此，本論文首先於犯罪論的層次中，依循犯罪階層體系架構依序在各個階層之中，介紹各種可能的刑罰權節制方法。其後復於刑罰論的層次中，從比較法制的觀點，從美國「沙式法案」的立法內容與增補後的「聯邦處刑指導原則」此兩項主要規範，介紹此類犯罪於量刑時的各種可能考量因素，藉以拼湊出世界各國目前的立法潮流與趨勢。 最後，本論文回到問題的根源，探討並說明雖然目前世界各國的立法趨勢似乎均是以「強化財務資訊的刑事管制」作為主軸，然而，過度強調刑罰的預防功能與效果，藉以強化重刑化刑事政策的正當性，其實無法解決根本的問題。財務資訊不實的犯罪行為乃是源自於資訊不對稱的結構，而以刑罰成本的提高用以降低代理成本的支出，仍舊是整體社會成本的虛耗。因此，合理的管制架構應當是具有積極防堵意味的「內部監控機制」，而非著重於消極式事後評價的外部監控機制。本論文希冀能透過粗淺的說明與分析，提供未來我國在立法或管制架構的設計上，另一種不同的思考方向與選擇。

Attributing to the significant and noticeable Fraudulent Financial Reporting events during the past years all over the world, the corporate governance has become a burgeoning issue. Generally, the approaches to deal with this “epidemics sweeping the worldwide capital markets”, in addition to the method appealing to the concept of “Social Corporate Responsibility” (“CSR”), could be analyzed in two dimensions, the Internal Control and the External Control under the legal system. First of all, the Internal Control approach mainly focuses on developing and designing an appropriate and institutional mechanism in the corporate legal systems such as the Company Law and the Security Exchange Act. In other words, the Internal Control is developed to prevent the related commitment of Security Fraud by requiring the companies to establish some institutional supervision mechanisms, e.g. the rights entitled to shareholders, the establishment of the postions such as the independent directors, the supervisors or the independent auditing staff. On the other hand, the External Control contains both passive and constructive meanings and fuctions. In the constructive and positive sense, the administrative supervision is conducted by the competent authorities to prevent the related commitment of Security Fraud. On the contrary, the passive fuction means the approach which comprehensively acknowledging the rights and claims entitled to the investors and competent authorities for the losses of investors to be compensated and the wrongdoings of the managers to be fined and punished under civil laws and administrative laws respectively. With respect to the criminal liabilities on the commitment of Fraudulent Financial Reporting, the criminal norms are also generally thought to have the passive function and the constructive meaning as well. That is, by imposting the criminal sanctions on people who prepared and provided the Fraudulent Financial Reports, including the financial statements which report historical financial information and the forward-looking financial statements, the criminal norms not only penalize people who committed the crime but also prevent the crimes in the future. Actually, as a matter of fact, the essence of the Fraudulent Financial Reporting is derived from the structure of Information Asymmetry between the investors and the managers of the companies under the agency model. In accordance with the Agency Thoery, as an uninformed party, the investors will spend agent cost and transaction cost to avoid adverse selection or the moral hazard behaviors conducted by the managers of the companies (the “Agent”). However, excessive agent cost and transaction cost may probably result in Market Failure of the capital market. Thus, both the the Internal Control and the External Control are the mechanisms designed for the purpose of reducing the agent cost and transaction cost in nature. Therefore, the related criminal liabilities on Fraudulent Financial Reporting set forth in the Security Exchange Act could be realized as the norms designed for the purpose of maintaining the basic confindence of the investors towards the fairness, reasonableness and dependability of the capital market. Under this premise, this thesis is proposed to analyze the current norms of the Security Exchange Act and other related laws and regulations to determine the application criteria between the norms in the first instance. In addition, from the viewpoint of foreign legal systems, this thesis is proposed to further introduce the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 and SUPPLEMENT TO THE 2002 GUIDELINES MANUAL of the United States to find out the current legislative trend around the world. Nonetheless, although the major efforts on fighting against the Fraudulent Financial Reporting were made in raising the criminal liabilities in the current legislative trend, since the risks in the capital market are arised from the essential structure and would be never completely eliminated, the only purpose of the criminal norms are developed to “control” the risks to a reasonable extent. Besides, just because the incentives of people who commit the crimes differ and the effectiveness of the crime-preventing function is doubtful, the function of the criminal norms shall be understood as merley a “behavior criterion” instead of an effective crime-preventing mechanism. In conclusion, regarding the issue of Fraudulent Financial Reporting, by means of observing and analyzing the current laws and regulations under different legal systems, the viewpoints from Information Economics and the decisions and precedents made by the courts, this thesis is proposed to determine an effective and appropriate mechanisms to be adopted and make the suggetions for the legislators’ reference in the future.