古典文藝中的辯證與修辭

Abstract

「哲學」與「修辭」之爭由來已久，始自於柏拉圖對於詭辯學家的攻訐，因後者所運用的說服術不僅以言語的力量媚惑聽眾，且其終極目標亦非導向「智識」，因而不相容於柏拉圖式的形上學。但回歸到柏拉圖的文本時，吾人可見，「哲學」與「修辭」之爭必須置於「對話」的脈絡來看，也就是說，就算是柏拉圖，此「爭」意味著方法學之爭，是兩種辯論術之間的糾葛，並非傳統上認為的形上學與語言之間的對立。準之，本研究意圖修正此認知，認為此爭源自於「辯證」對於「修辭」的抗衡，君不見，蘇格拉底總是運用其定義式的提問消弭詭辯學家的話術所加諸的非知識性之認知。因此，本研究在此前提下，將爬梳古典時期中「辯證」與「修辭」間的種種關係，研究範圍包括柏拉圖、亞里斯多德、伊底帕斯悲劇、西賽羅、奧古斯丁、以及博修斯。

This is a study committed to the question how dialectic and rhetoric—as two modes of argumentation—are textualized in Classical antiquity. The inquiry is launched primarily with a view to redressing and rephrasing the time-honored clash between philosophy and rhetoric ever since Plato opposes the former to the latter in the Gorgias. Through this conflict, philosophy has been portrayed as a matter of metaphysics indicative of objectivity and totality and thus ethical correctness, in contradistinction to rhetoric, which, for lack of alethic requirements, “has been given negative connotations of insincerity, mere display, artifice, or ornament without substance” (Vickers viii). Such opposition points to the dichotomization between reality and language, suggesting a hierarchy whereby “word” correlates philosophy only when it serves the purpose of the latter, as in Plato’s Phaedrus, where a “philosophical” rhetoric is possible under the aegis of episteme. Yet, as recent thoughts have constantly highlighted the role of language in the formation of what one can actually know, the conflict between philosophy, as a metaphysical system, and rhetoric, as the realm of deceptive words, has also been brought into question. For instance, Samuel Ijsseling touches upon the “rehabilitation of rhetoric” (4) and argues that philosophy by no means suffices on its own since its enforcement is largely determined by verbal maneuvers (5). “In short,” as he comments on what concerns rhetoric, “what really happens whenever something is said or something is written” (5)? It is obvious then, that what one claims to know derives from the outcome of a certain dialogical process; the expression of a philosophical proposition always has an “other” working to engage the philosopher in an implicit dialogue. In other words, there is no such a thing as apodictic truth because everything known is linguistically constructed. For Ijsseling, rhetorical concerns naturally correspond to language uses. However, the “rehabilitation of rhetoric” is in no way a restoration of the ancient rhetoric. For one thing, Ijsseling’s argument rhetoricizes whatever is said or written without heeding the fact that there indeed exists a conflict for Plato. The other is that this very conflict is represented in Socratic argumentation with the Sophists. That is to say, Socratic figures argue to annul sophistry and achieve the Platonic metaphysics. Specifically, the clash is hence that between “dialectic” and “rhetoric,” by which one can rightly pinpoint the zetetic aspect of the “philosophy” shown in Plato’s dialogues. It is based on this working argument that the present study retraces the origin of the conflict and examines its evolution in Classical antiquity. With the source of the time-honored conflict clarified, this study then undertakes to explore the “symbiotic” relationships between dialectic and rhetoric in Classical antiquity. The first chapter returns to the primal scene, that is, the Gorgias, to see how “dialectic” and “rhetoric” are respectively formed in clash with each other. It also identifies the features and strategies particular to each mode of argumentation as textualized by Plato in this dialogue. The second chapter goes on to Aristotle for the sake of examining how he re-textualizes the two modes of argumentation, and in particular, how he philosophizes rhetoric at the expense of dialectic. The third chapter looks into the Oedipus tragedy. Or, more specifically, it studies the literary text via Aristotle’s conceptualization of it in Poetics. The purpose is to show that there exists in the Oedipus tragedy an underlying convergence of dialectic and rhetoric though the text is traditionally thought to be “literary.” The following two chapters turn to the Romans. Chapter Four discusses Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations and Boethius’ The Consolation of Philosophy to search into the manner by which the Roman literati attempt the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric. It is found that the two modes of argumentation take on a new façade. Although dialectic remains a verbal tool for philosophizing, its role becomes quite vague in relation to both philosophy and rhetoric. Chapter Five mainly studies Augustine’s De Magistro to find out how the two modes of argumentation are transformed in face of Christianity. Already critical of rhetoric, Augustine is seen to drastically alter the constitution of dialectic to the extent that dialectic dwindles into insignificance: the real “dialectic” is a metaphysical occurrence, truly irrelevant to words by now. Through these discussions on dialectic in relation to rhetoric, it is hoped that a genealogical and historical perspective can be revealed regarding conventional readings of the conflict between philosophy and rhetoric.