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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 蔡彥卿 | |
dc.contributor.author | Sheng-Yin Hsiao | en |
dc.contributor.author | 蕭聖穎 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T07:32:25Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2008-07-07 | |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2008-06-22 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 洪榮華、陳香如與王玉珍,2005,公司內部治理機制與公司績效之關係—股權結構與董事會特性的觀點,輔仁管理評論第十二卷第三期p23-p40。
陳信甫,2004,員工分紅制度與公司特質之關聯性研究,東吳大學會計學系碩士論文。 陳振遠、張智堯、王蘭芬與李文智,2005,應用Ohlson會計評價模型探究公司治理之價值攸關性—以台灣上市公司電子業為例,臺大管理論叢第十五卷第二期p123-p142。 葉金成與李冠豪,2001,盈餘與股價因果關係之實證研究,當代會計第二卷第一期p17-p40。 Ball R. and P. Brown, 1968. An empirical of accounting income numbers. Journal of Accounting Research 6, 159-178. Beaver, W., R. Clark and W. Wright, 1979. The Association between unsystematic security percentage change in prices and the magnitude of earnings forecast errors. Journal of Accounting Research 17, 316-340. Bushman, R., Qi, C., Engel, E. and Smith, A., 2004. Financial accounting information, organizational complexity and corporate governance systems. Journal of Accounting and Economics 37 (2), 167–201. Dechow, P., Sloan, R. and Sweeney, A., 1996. Causes and consequences of earnings manipulations: an analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research 13, 1–36. Ding, D. and S. Qian, 2001. Cause and effects of employee stock option plans: Evidence from Singapore. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 563-599. Edwards, J. and A. Weichenrieder., 2001. Ownership Concentration and Share Valuation: Evidence from Germany. Working Paper. (http://ssrn.com/abstract=272627) Gaver, J. J., and K. M. Gaver, 1993. Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend and compensation policies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16 (January), 125-160. Greg Clinch, 1991. Employee Compensation and Firms' Research and Development Activity. Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 29, No. 1, 59-78. Kellogg, I., and L. B. Kellogg, 1991. Fraud, Window Dressing, and Negligence in Financial Statements. Commercial Law Series, McGraw-Hill. Klein April, 2002. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33, 375–400. Lewellen, W., C. Loderer, and K. Martin, 1987. Executive compensation and executive incentive problems: An empirical approach. Journal of Accounting and Economics 9 (December), 287-310. Lo, K., 2007. Earnings management and earnings quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics. Matsunaga, Steven R., 1995. The Effects of Financial Reporting Costs on the Use of Employee Stock Options. The Accounting Review Vol. 70, No. 1, 1-26. National Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 1993. Cooking the Books: What Every Accountant Should Know about Fraud. NASBA, New York, NY. Pound, J., 1988. Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight. Journal of Financial Economics 20(1-2), 237-265. Stuart L. Gillan, 2006. Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview. Journal of Corporate Finance 12, 381– 402. Warfield, T., Wild, J., Wild, K., 1995. Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 20, 55–100. Wild, J.J., 1996. The audit committee and earnings quality. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 11. Zmijewski, M. and R. Hagerman, 1981. An income strategy approach to the positive theory of accounting standard setting/choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics 3, 129-149. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/26920 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 員工分紅與員工認股權同屬薪資結構的一環,其會計處理部分,員工分紅費用化及財務會計準則公報第三十九號「股份基礎給付之會計處理準則」均自民國97年起適用,故國內企業於民國97年1月1日後,除員工分紅將於財報發布前估列費用,員工認股權於發行日起亦將依公平價值認列費用。然而,員工認股權存有閉鎖期不得轉換之特性,企業可能提前發行未來的員工認股權,暫時規避第三十九號公報之適用,進而美化未來帳面盈餘。本研究以民國93年至96年曾經發行員工認股權之上市公司為樣本觀測值,依各企業民國96年異常發放狀況衡量未來可能的盈餘操縱情勢,探究員工認股權異常發放之公司特質,本研究將公司特質大略分為經理人股權、盈餘操縱動機與公司治理監督機制。實證結果顯示:員工認股權超額發放與經理人股權呈正比;盈餘操縱動機部分,員工認股權超額發放與企業之研發投入程度及融資需求性呈正比、另與企業未來獲利能力成反比;公司治理監督機制部分,董事會規模與員工認股權超額發放呈反比,而獨立董事比例達一定成數後,將抑制員工認股權超額發放數額。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T07:32:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-97-R95722039-1.pdf: 491522 bytes, checksum: f5393f73a374c3e03bfdc19ab39769d9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與研究動機 1 第二節 研究目的 5 第三節 研究架構 6 第二章 文獻探討 9 第一節 員工激勵制度 9 第二節 員工認股權與盈餘管理 13 第三節 經理人盈餘操縱之動機與限制 14 第三章 研究方法 24 第一節 研究假說 25 第二節 樣本選取 29 第三節 上市公司異常發放狀況與依變數定義 31 第四節 自變數定義與資料來源 34 第五節 OLS與Tobit模型 39 第四章 實證結果 41 第一節 敘述統計、共線性分析與樣本迴歸式 41 第二節 線性模型(CLRM)假設之檢測 50 第三節 參數估計值之涵義 50 第五章 結論 55 第一節 研究結論 55 第二節 研究限制 57 第三節 後續研究建議 57 參考文獻 60 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 員工認股權異常發放之公司特質分析 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Corporate Analysis for Extraordinary Distribution of Employee Stock Option | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 96-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 李文智,簡雪芳 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 員工認股權,薪資結構,盈餘管理,盈餘操縱,公司治理, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Employee stock options,Compensation structure (scheme),Earnings management,Earnings manipulation,Corporate governance, | en |
dc.relation.page | 62 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2008-06-23 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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