知覺哲學中的雙構件理論與表徵理論

Abstract

雙構件理論是由Paul Coates所提出的一種知覺的哲學理論。其主張解釋知覺經驗，需要訴諸經驗的兩種構件：現象構件，以及概念構件。意識的表徵理論則主張意識經驗中的現象特性，可以完全被意識經驗的表徵內容所解釋。本文介紹與討論雙構件理論如何解釋各種知覺經驗，並循表徵理論的脈絡，主要關注知覺經驗所牽涉之表徵內容與現象特性兩大課題。 本文將論證Coates為辯護現象構件提出的相減論證是失敗的，解釋信念與知覺經驗的主觀感受差異並不需要訴諸現象構件。而即使相減論證成功，解釋許多知覺經驗間的差異也不需要訴諸現象構件。本文並將論證雙構件理論並不能良好地解釋透明性現象。同時，本文會進一步討論隱含期待如何幫助表徵理論回應歧義圖形帶來的困難，並且解釋為何某些歧義圖形對表徵理論造成困難。本文認為，現象構件必非解釋知覺經驗所必須的理論預設，同時表徵理論對透明性與歧義圖形兩知覺經驗現象也提供較佳的解釋。因此表徵理論比起雙構件理論，是較合理的知覺經驗理論。

The two-component view, advocated by Paul Coates, is a philosophical theory of perception. It maintains that a perceptional experience contains two components: phenomenal component and conceptual component. On the other hand, representationalism of consciousness maintains that the representational content of consciousness exhausts the phenomenal character of consciousness. This paper will discuss how the two-component view explains perception in terms of phenomenal component and conceptual component. This paper will focus on the representational content and the phenomenal character involved in perceptional experience. I will argue that the subtraction argument for phenomenal component fails, and phenomenal component is not need to explain the subjective differences between beliefs and perceptual experiences. Even if the subtraction argument succeeds, phenomenal component is not needed to explain differences between many perceptual experiences. This paper will then argue that the two-component view has problems in explaining transparency. This paper will discuss how implicit expectation can help representationalism reply to problems some ambiguous figures pose, and explain why these ambiguous figure pose problems. In sum, this paper maintains that phenomenal component is not needed to explain perceptual experiences, and that representationalism can explain transparency and ambiguous figures in a more satisfying way. Therefore, representationalism is a more reasonable theory of perception.