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標題: | 雙占基本品廠商之最適互補品策略 The Optimal Strategy of Complementary Good for Duopoly Firms |
作者: | Ho-Lin Tsai 蔡和霖 |
指導教授: | 周善瑜 |
關鍵字: | 互補品,產品線策略, complementary good,product line strategy, |
出版年 : | 2005 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 本論文旨在探討雙占基本品廠商之最適互補品策略與對基本品競爭所造成的影響。過去有關互補品的研究大多將焦點放在產品組合訂價與網路外部性等議題並視互補品為外生變數,而較少從製造商角度討論互補品的推出策略,因此本文嘗試分析若可選擇是否推出互補品時會如何影響競爭廠商間之產品與訂價策略。我們建立一賽局模型假設兩製造商皆生產基本品,產品間不僅品質有差異且在消費者心理定位上亦有所不同,而消費者對基本品心理偏好為均勻分配。研究發現互補品推出與否取決於兩基本品帶給消費者之效用與其搭配互補品所得之效用增額,研究結果如下:
一、當互補品效用增額差異不大時,若某製造商獨家推出互補品,該廠商必會將互補品訂低價以服務市場所有消費者。若兩製造商皆選擇推出互補品的情況,雙方在基本品與互補品的訂價將會呈現一類似組合產品訂價的一組價格,且兩製造商之互補品訂價都將小於移轉成本以避免互補品市場為對手所獨占。 二、當基本品效用差異愈大,高階基本品廠商愈願意推出互補品;而低階基本品製造商則愈不願意推出互補品。 三、即使在互補品搭配高階基本品之效用增額較高,在對手不願推出互補品下,低階基本品製造商仍可能願意獨家推出互補品。且隨著互補品效用增額差異愈強烈,低階基本品製造商反而願意投入更高研發成本以推出互補品。 四、在預期競爭者將不推出互補品時,高階基本品製造商即使在研發成本大過互補品本身所帶來的利潤下,仍願意投入成本推出互補品。 五、當互補品搭配高階基本品效用增額較高且差異夠大時,即使無須花費任何研發成本,高階基本品製造商仍會選擇讓低階基本品製造商獨家提供互補品而不會選擇同時推出互補品。 六、當互補品搭配高階基本品效用增額極大時,低階基本品製造商若可獨家推出互補品,則其將放棄基本品市場而專心提供互補品、與競爭者轉為合作關係,且高階基本品製造商亦可因此獲得較單純獨占時更高的利潤。 In this paper, we analyze the optimal strategies of complementary good for duopoly firms who compete in the market of basic goods. We build a game-theoretic model where two firms produce their basic products that differ not only in quality but also in their positions in a horizontal space where consumers’ ideal points are uniformly distributed. Our results show that the decision of whether to introduce a complement product depends on consumers’ valuations to the basic products of the two competing firms, the value added to the two basic products, and the level of R&D expenditures required, by the complementary product. The results are as follows: 1. When the value added to the two competing basic products by the complementary good is small, the firm that exclusively introduces the complementary good will set a price low enough to serve all consumers. If both firms introduce the complementary good in equilibrium each firm will set its price not higher than consumers’store-switching cost to prevent its customers of the basic product from buying its rival’s complementary product. The more the difference in consumers’ valuations to the two basic products, the more the high-end firm (the one producing the high-end basic product) will be willing to introduce the complementary good while the opposite holds for the low-end firm. 2. Even if the value added to the high-end basic product by the complementary good is higher than that to the low-end one, the low-end firm will still be willing to exclusively introduce the complementary good by incurring a high R&D cost. The incentive of the low-end firm to introduce the complementary product increases with the valuation differential in the complementary product. 3. When expecting its rival will not introduce the complementary good, the high-end firm is willing to introduce the complementary product despite that the associated R&D cost outweighs the profit from selling the complementary good. 4. When the value added to the high-end basic product by the complementary good is high enough, the high-level firm will optimally choose not to introduce the complementary good when expecting its rival will introduce it. 5. When the value added to the high-end basic product by the complementary good is extremely high, the low-end firm may give up its basic product and concentrate on the complementary market. In this situation, two firms become monopolists in their respective markets and act cooperatively. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/24503 |
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顯示於系所單位: | 商學研究所 |
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