標準嚴格程度、薪酬制度及工作績效間關係：風險規避程度及工作複雜度的調節作用

Abstract

本研究主題有三，(1)檢驗標準嚴格程度、薪酬制度與工作績效間的關係。(2)探討風險規避程度是否在上述關係中扮演調節的角色。(3)探討不同工作複雜度下，風險規避程度對於薪酬制度選擇之影響。 本研究採實驗室實驗的方式，共招募232位大學生擔任受試者，分別進行轉碼工作(中度複雜)及算術問題(高度複雜)。研究結果顯示: (1)在中度複雜的轉碼工作下，僅有標準嚴格程度與風險規避程度之交互作用顯著；而在高度複雜的算術問題下，則僅有標準嚴格程度、薪酬制度及薪酬制度與風險規避程度之交互作用顯著，未完全符合研究假說之預期。(2)風險規避程度對於薪酬制度選擇之影響會受到工作複雜度之調節，唯有在高度複雜的工作下，其對於薪酬制度選擇之影響方會顯現。

This study examines (1) the independent and joint effects of standard tightness and compensation scheme on job performance, (2) the role of risk-aversion in the above effects, and (3) whether the effect of risk-aversion on compensation scheme selection is moderated by task complexity. Recruiting 232 undergraduate students as the participants in an experiment in which some participants perform the decoding task (moderate complexity) while the others solve the arithmetic problem (high complexity), this study obtains the following findings. First, for the decoding task, only the interaction between standard tightness and risk-aversion has a significant effect on job performance. For the arithmetic problem, standard tightness, compensation scheme, and the interaction between compensation scheme and risk-aversion have significant effects on job performance. Further, after controlling for the effect of capability, risk-aversion affects compensation scheme selection in the arithmetic problem, but not the decoding task, suggesting that the effect of risk-aversion on compensation scheme selection varies with task complexity.